If Intuitions Must Be Evidential then Philosophy is in Big Trouble

Abstract

Many philosophers claim that intuitions are evidential. Yet it is hard to see how introspecting one's mental states could provide evidence for such synthetic truths as those concerning, for example, the abstract and the counterfactual. Such considerations have sometimes been taken to lead to mentalism-the view that philosophy must concern itself only with matters of concept application or other minddependent topics suited to a contemplative approach-but this provides us with a poor account of what it is that philosophers take themselves to be doing, for many of them are concerned with the extra-mental facts about the universe. Evidentialism therefore gestates a disaster for philosophy, for it ultimately demands an epistemology for the investigation into such matter as the abstract and the modal that simply will not be forthcoming. We make a di erent suggestion: at intuitions are inclinations to believe. Hence, according to us, a philosophical argument does well, as a socio-rhetorical matter of fact, when it is founded on premises philosophers are generally inclined to believe, whether or not those inclinations to believe connect appropriately to the extra-mental facts. Accordingly, the role of intuitions (inclinations to believe) in philosophical methodology is non-evidential, and the question of how they could be used as evidence falls away.

A Partial Defence of Descriptive Evidentialism About Intuitions: A Reply to Molyneux

“…A number of books and papers have recently argued against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions in philosophy (e.g., Cappelen 2012Cappelen , 2014Deutsch 2010Deutsch , 2015Earlenbaugh and Molyneux 2009;Ichikawa 2014). Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence.…”

De l’impossibilité du savoir intuitif conçu comme état purement mental et d’une difficulté que cela soulève pour l’évidentialisme1

“…À ce sujet, cf. Cappelen, 2012 ;Deutsch, 2015 ;Earlenbaugh et Molyneux, 2009 ;Williamson, 2000. 9. Pour un argument similaire, cf.…”

New Arguments that Philosophers don't Treat Intuitions as Evidence

“…It has, however, come under attack. Critics contend that intuitions cannot be cross‐verified by other evidence sources (Cummins ; Weinberg et al ), and that their truth does not feature in the best explanation of why we have them (e.g., Williamson , 119; Harman ; Goldman ; Earlenbaugh and Molyneux ). Meanwhile, experimental philosophers complain that philosophers' intuitions do not match those of the general population, and that they vary not only as a function of cultural demographic (e.g., Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich ; Machery et al ) but also in response to recently considered cases (Swain, Alexander, and Weinberg ).…”

“…Occasionally an author will offer a list of cases that demonstrates pretty conclusively that intuitions are widely used in philosophy but not (despite the author's intention) that they are used as evidence (see, e.g., Bealer , 30; Pust , 227). Not surprisingly, some philosophers are beginning to question descriptive evidentialism (e.g., Gendler ; Earlenbaugh and Molyneux , ; Deutsch ; Cappelen ; Ichikawa forthcoming). Adding to this growing countermovement, I present a number of new considerations to the effect that we do not treat intuitions as evidence.…”