Ideology and Threat Perceptions: American Public Opinion toward China and Iran

Abstract

What determines threat perceptions in the context of potential interstate conflict? We argue that such perceptions are to an important extent driven by domestic political cleavages and ideological differences. The ideology effects are often surprising and are more complex than the conventional wisdom would indicate. We specify the conditions under which conservatives may favor the economic rise of rising powers. Concern about budget deficits affects not only domestic political preferences but also threat perceptions. Finally, civil libertarianism in certain contexts can lead to isolationist preferences. We test these claims using the 2012 American National Election Studies data about the perceptions of American citizens of the economic and military rise of China, and of potential American responses to Iran’s nuclear program.

Demographic change and the 2016 presidential election

“…5 In the case of the current study, I hypothesize that Trump's public framing may have primed a backlash effect, and that such an effect may be reflected in his likelihood of capturing votes in places that have undergone rapid demographic change. Lastly, it is worth noting that, although the focus of the Trump campaign was clearly on Hispanic migration, it is worth analyzing Asian migration as well given Trump's anti-China rhetoric that could be viewed through an anti-Asian framework (Mirilovic and Kim 2017;Stracqualursi 2017), and more generally because of the importance of comparing the reception of Hispanic and Asian immigration in the contemporary United States (Ha 2010;Pew Research Center 2015).…”

An ‘existential threat’ or a ‘past pariah’: Securitisation of Iran and disagreements among American press

“…In fact, when it is about 'national Self' versus 'national Other' (who we are), both groups of actors (conservative Right and liberal Left) foreground core common aspects of their national identity; however, when it comes to deciding which measure should be taken for dealing with a threat to national security (what we should do), ideological differences are prioritised. As Mirilovic and Kim (2016) argue, international issues 'are often interpreted via ideological categories based in domestic politics' (p. 180). Therefore, while both groups of actors demonised Iran as a security threat for America ('national Self' versus 'national Other'), each group emphasised a different set of American values and, consequently, opted for a different measure for addressing the threat.…”

Brazilian left-right ideology and public perception of China\'s rise: a perspective of university students

“…Left-right ideology has been well recognized by scholars as an informational shortcut that serves as an orientation function for individuals and a communication function for the political system (CALIN, 2010;FREIRE;KIVISTIK, 2013;FUCHS;KLINGEMANN, 1990). Some researchers believe that, since information about politics and its implications for personal interests are usually costly to acquire and analyze, as a response, individuals adopt an ideological orientation to establish which issues to prioritize, integrating their attitudes and ideas about politics into coherent patterns (MIRILOVIC; KIM, 2017;NOEL;THERIEN, 2008).…”

“…Besides, the left-right label is also believed to have provided a means of communication between politicians and the electorate by having its symbol used to differentiate among political parties (AMES; SMITH, 2010;CESAR, 2009). In this way, ideology is assumed to be able to offer us a clue to understand and predict individual's political attitudes and behaviors, and has thereby gained worldwide importance with the spread of electoral democracy (FUCHS; KLINGEMANN, 1990;GRIES;CROWSON, 2010;MARTINI, 2012;MIRILOVIC;KIM, 2017;NINCIC;RAMOS, 2010;NOEL;THERIEN, 2008;SINGER, 1999).…”

“…Empirical studies that investigate ideology's impact on foreign policy preference at a mass level have shown that individuals' ideological categories based on domestic politics can be applied to the international realm without significant loss of meaning: the right (also recognized as Republicans or conservatives in the US) always leans toward hardline and belligerent foreign policy while the left (also recognized as Democrats or liberals in the US) tend to embrace accommodationist and internationalist policies (GRIES; CROWSON, 2010;MARTINI, 2012;MIRILOVIC;KIM, 2017;NINCIC;RAMOS, 2010). Cassels (2002) explains this phenomenon by taking account of ideology's communication function: since foreign policy attitudes are divided among political leaders by left-right cleavage, this can be transmitted to and perceived by a mass audience.…”