Ideology and Monetary Policy: The Role of Political Parties’ Stances in the ECB's Parliamentary Hearings

Fraccaroli, Nicolò; Giovannini, Alessandro; Jamet, Jean-François; Persson, Eric

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4057810

Cited by 2 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…The reactions to fluctuations are also different, according to Woodford [9], and part of the theory for conservative ideologies is supported by empirical analyses like what Berger and Woitek did on Bundesbank [10]. Fraccaroli found that pro-/anti-EU divide have effects on MEP's stances to the ECB, which can influence the domestic monetary policies in EU countries [4].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 91%

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The Monetary Policy Preferences of Left- and Right-Wing Populism

Wang

2023

AEMPS

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The paper uses a Taylor-rule model for central banks to examine the economic outcome of modern populism. Annual data of major OECD countries from 2001 to 2019 is applied to examine the overall level of populism in the regime, the left/right divide of the regime and the populist political force, the independence of the central bank from the political regime to model the target interest rate. The results verify the impact of populism on monetary policy and the invalidity of the traditional partisan approach, and distinguish the different effect of left- and right-wing populism. A populist regime favors low interest rate than a non-populist regime, and a leftist populist regime prefers expansionary monetary policies than rightist populist regime. Such a divide in monetary policy preference can be used as a classification criterion for classification of populist political forces, with The Five Star Movement in Italy as an example.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…Fraccaroli stated that the issue that shaped the tone of legislators in ECB has turned from the traditional left-right divide to the pro-/anti-EU divide [4], and we will regard the latter as a specific case of the former. However, the definition of economically left-wing and right-wing populism has been a difficult question.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Monetary Policy Preferences of Left- and Right-Wing Populism

Wang

2023

AEMPS

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“…Democratically, because European citizens are directly represented by the EP, next to their indirect representation in the Council as member state citizens (Article 10 TEU; (von Bogdandy, 2012, p. 322). Legally, the involvement of the EP would fit with the fact that monetary policy is an exclusive competence of the Union (Article 3 (1) TFEU) and that, for this reason, the ECB also sees itself as accountable at the EU level for its monetary policy operations (Fraccaroli et al, 2018). Moreover, the secondary objectives are intertwined with policy areas where the EP has a stronger role than in the coordination of general economic policy, environmental protection being a key example (Article 191 and 192 TFEU).…”

Section: Policy Coordination Within the Emumentioning

confidence: 99%

What to Do with the ECB's Secondary Mandate

Klooster

Boer

2022

J of Common Market Studies

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The ECB's secondary mandate requires it to support broader economic policies by and in the EU. How should the ECB deal with its many, potentially conflicting, objectives? To answer that question, this article combines normative and legal analysis with new archival sources, as well as analysis of ECB speeches and documents. A more important role for its secondary mandate fits well with the new, more political role of the ECB. However, the requirements that the legal text imposes on the ECB are paradoxical. While strictly binding, the secondary mandate is also highly indeterminate, and the ECB lacks the democratic legitimacy and legal competence to develop its own policies for pursuing the secondary objectives. To resolve this paradoxical situation, we propose that the specification of the ECB's secondary objectives should take place via high-level coordination with the political institutions of the EU.

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Ideology and Monetary Policy: The Role of Political Parties’ Stances in the ECB's Parliamentary Hearings

Cited by 2 publications

References 93 publications

The Monetary Policy Preferences of Left- and Right-Wing Populism

The Monetary Policy Preferences of Left- and Right-Wing Populism

What to Do with the ECB's Secondary Mandate

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