Ideological Asymmetries and the Determinants of Politically Motivated Reasoning

Abstract

A large literature demonstrates that conservatives have greater needs for certainty than liberals. This suggests an asymmetry hypothesis: Conservatives are less open to new information that conflicts with their political identity and, in turn, political accountability will be lower on the right than the left. However, recent work suggests that liberals and conservatives are equally prone to politically motivated reasoning (PMR). The present article confronts this puzzle. First, we identify significant limitations of extant studies evaluating the asymmetry hypothesis and deploy two national survey experiments to address them. Second, we provide the first direct test of the key theoretical claim underpinning the asymmetry hypothesis: epistemic needs for certainty promote PMR. We find little evidence for the asymmetry hypothesis. Importantly, however, we also find no evidence that epistemic needs promote PMR. That is, although conservatives report greater needs for certainty than liberals, these needs are not a major source of political bias.

Rethinking the link between cognitive sophistication and politically motivated reasoning.

“…In other words, the most cognitively sophisticated opposing partisans tended to disagree most strongly in their evaluations of the validity of the test. A similar pattern has been observed in studies that use the same general design structure, but that used indicators of cognitive sophistication other than CRT performance, such as political knowledge (Guay & Johnston, 2020; Kuru et al, 2017; Taber et al, 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006) or numeracy (Guay & Johnston, 2020; Kahan, Peters, et al, 2017; Nurse & Grant, 2019); in studies that used measures of political attitudes in lieu of political identity per se (Kuru et al, 2017; Taber et al, 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006); as well as across several different political issues and outcome variables therein.…”

“…Our results imply that much existing evidence for the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication magnifies politically motivated reasoning is not particularly diagnostic. Specifically, our argument and results suggest that previous empirical studies supporting the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication magnifies politically motivated reasoning (Guay & Johnston, 2020; Kahan, 2013; Kahan, Peters, et al, 2017; Kuru et al, 2017; Nurse & Grant, 2019; Sumner et al, 2018; Taber et al, 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006) likely do not demonstrate that cognitive sophistication magnifies a direct effect of political group motivation on reasoning (Causal Path 1, Figure 1); but, rather, that it magnifies a direct effect of prior factual beliefs (Causal Path 2). It is thus difficult to evaluate the extent to which the results therein offer support for the hypothesis that cognitive sophistication magnifies politically motivated reasoning—because, as we have discussed at length, Causal Path 2 offers relatively ambiguous evidence of politically motivated reasoning per se (we refer to the Rethinking Cognitive Sophistication and Politically Motivated Reasoning section for the full discussion).…”

“…The results of numerous recent studies suggest that cognitive sophistication could magnify politically motivated reasoning (Guay & Johnston, 2020; Kahan, 2013; Kahan, Peters, et al, 2017; Kuru, Pasek, & Traugott, 2017; Nurse & Grant, 2019; Sumner, Scofield, Buchanan, Evans, & Shearing, 2018; Taber, Cann, & Kucsova, 2009; Taber & Lodge, 2006). In one study (Kahan, 2013), for example, U.S. partisans were asked to evaluate the validity of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), a behavioral measure of the propensity and ability to think analytically (Frederick, 2005; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016).…”

The Influence of Unknown Media on Public Opinion: Evidence from Local and Foreign News Sources

“…The decision to avoid an unfamiliar source may not mean people would resist the source’s coverage if they encountered it. Recent political psychology work supports this perspective by arguing that partisan differences in misinformation are not due to innate between-group differences in willingness to accept inaccurate claims or follow partisan cues but derive instead from differential patterns of information exposure (Guay and Johnston 2021; Ryan and Aziz 2021). In other words, on issues where they exhibit less misinformation, Democrats may not be able to more effectively resist misinformed claims than Republicans, they may just more successfully avoid such content.…”

Polarized climate change beliefs: No evidence for science literacy driving motivated reasoning in a U.S. national study.

“…This correlational finding was later attributed to "the power of motivated cognition" (Kahan, 2012b). Similar interactions between measures of knowledge or skill, and political leaning were found in national surveys (Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017;Hamilton, 2011;Hamilton et al, 2015;Malka et al, 2009;McCright & Dunlap, 2011), as well as experimental studies on topics such as gun control, immigration, or Brexit (Guay & Johnston, 2021;Kuru et al, 2017;Sumner et al, 2018;Taber & Lodge, 2006).…”