Identity, Conflict and Cooperation in International River Systems

Kalpakian, Jack

doi:10.4324/9781351156127

Cited by 9 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…In the early stage of Nile River development, only Egypt carried out significant projects on the river, such as the Aswan High Dam, without consultation with upstream stakeholders. Thus, there was little potential for cooperation in the basin, because Egypt always had a large share of the Nile water, which can be defined as stage I (Kalpakian, 2017). However, as the claims of upstream countries developed, deeper conflicts gave birth to the potential for cooperation in stage II.…”

Section: Water Resources Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was established in 1999, because of the lack of trust between the participating countries, the NBI did not play any role in negotiations and was dissolved (Tafesse, 2001). Until 2010, most riparian countries joined the Nile initiative, marking the start of cooperation and the potential evolution from stage II to stage III (Kalpakian, 2017). However, good cooperation did not last long.…”

Section: Water Resources Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evolutionary Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins

Tang

Zhao

et al. 2019

Water Resources Research

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Cooperation in transboundary river basins can make water resources systems more efficient and benefit riparian stakeholders. However, in a basin with upstream and downstream stakeholders that have different interests, noncooperative outcomes have often been observed. These can be described by a one‐shot prisoners' dilemma game where noncooperation (defection) is a dominant equilibrium strategy. However, cooperative outcomes have also been observed in several transboundary settings, such as the Lancang‐Mekong River Basin in Asia. Such cooperation motivates our research effort to refine relevant game theoretic descriptions to account for the evolution of players' behaviors, from conflict to cooperation. In this study, a repeated game model is proposed to analyze evolutionary transboundary cooperation. A generalized evolutionary cooperation pattern with four stages is summarized, starting with noncooperation and ending with in‐depth cooperation. The Lancang‐Mekong River Basin and three other typical transboundary river management case studies are chosen to validate our theoretical findings. Upstream and downstream stakeholder behaviors are analyzed for these case studies, in accordance with a game payoff matrix that accounts for incentives to cooperate. The results indicate that patience and incremental benefits can lead stakeholders to adopt a cooperative equilibrium strategy if appropriate institutional mechanisms are in place. Such mechanisms can be developed through negotiations that recognize the wide range of stakeholder interests that may influence the decision to cooperate. Our analysis suggests that game theory can provide useful insights into the conditions and institutional mechanisms that foster cooperative strategies for managing transboundary water resources.

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Section: Water Resources Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Water Resources Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins

Tang

Zhao

et al. 2019

Water Resources Research

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“…It is assumed that identity constructs such as family, nationality, ethnicity and religious identities are much less fluid than educational, ideological and professional identities. Kalpakian (2004) who has undertaken extensive case studies on water, conflict and identity in the Nile, Tigris and Indus River Basins concludes that water does not cause violent conflict but it is identity that shapes people's attitudes and creates the others. Kalpakian challenges the assumption that water itself is the cause of conflict, concluding that identity plays a primary role in causing conflicts over water.…”

Section: The Role Of Identity and Empathy In Water Cooperation And Comentioning

confidence: 97%

“Playing the game”, identity and perception-of-the-other in water cooperation in the Jordan River Basin

Wessels

2016

Hydrological Sciences Journal

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The concept of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) has enjoyed immense popularity and thus has been the preferred approach for river basin management. IWRM generally has a strong focus on rational choice, based on a technocratic conceptual interpretation of the conventional hydrological cycle. However, uncritical acceptance of IWRM runs the risk of blinding policy makers and academics for the defining impact of context, socio-cultural, political, historical and cognitive dimensions in water cooperation. Human behaviour in water cooperation was tested and observed during eight experiments with the Jordan River Basin Boardgame Exercise (JRBBE) played with respondent groups from inside and outside the Jordan River Basin. The experiments consisted of one control group outside the basin and seven respondent groups both outside and inside the basin. This article argues that the role of identities, beliefs and perception-of-the-other, should be taken more into account in order to develop successful and socio-political sustainable river basin management.

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“…Without coordination with the downstream country of Iraq, Syria started filling the Thawra Reservoir, a newly built dam. Moreover, the area was hit by a significant drought [32] and consequently the flow of the Euphrates entering Iraq dropped from the normal 920 m 3 /s to just 197 m 3 /s [33]. Iraq complained and requested the Arab League to intervene; however, Syria refused to cooperate arguing that it was receiving less water from Turkey.…”

Section: A Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 97%

Inverse Approach to the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

Kinsara

Kilgour

Hipel

2015

IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybern, Syst.

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Systems methodologies to model third-party intervention in international conflicts are developed within the framework of the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR). An inverse GMCR is introduced to utilize the GMCR as a negotiation tool by altering the procedure of the original framework. The methodologies presented give a better understanding of how decision makers (DMs) can be motivated to undertake certain actions within the conflict. Moreover, the inverse GMCR tackles the problem of specifying which preferences for DMs lead to a particular resolution, thereby making it easier for a mediator or other third party to influence the course of the conflict. The methodologies are applied to a real-world dispute, a complex water conflict in the Middle East.

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Identity, Conflict and Cooperation in International River Systems

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

Evolutionary Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins

Evolutionary Cooperation in Transboundary River Basins

“Playing the game”, identity and perception-of-the-other in water cooperation in the Jordan River Basin

Inverse Approach to the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution

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