Identity and Obligation in a Transgenerational Polity

Abstract

Members of a political society typically regard themselves as participating in intergenerational relationships of obligation and entitlement. They value the inheritance they received from past generations, regard themselves as indebted to their forebears, and accept an obligation to pass on their heritage to their descendants. Liberalism, with its emphasis, on rights, contracts, and welfare of existing people, does not provide an adequate basis for intergenerational obligations. Communitarianism, by stressing communal values of the embedded self, is in a better position to explain why obligations in respect to the past as well as the future should play a central role in conceptions of justice. This chapter critically examines communitarian approaches to intergenerational obligations, and argues for an account of the self in which lifetime-transcending interests play an important role. It presents a theory of intergenerational obligations which makes use of communitarian insights but is also compatible with basic assumptions of liberalism.

What’s the point of parenthood? The agreed parenthood provisions under the HFE Act 2008 and inconsistency with intention

“…The common good must surely include 'family life and the natural bonds of kinship and identity that are at the heart of a well-functioning society' (Laing and Oderberg, 2005). Parenthood is by its nature shared across generations and engenders intergenerational obligations, characterised by some communitarian thinkers as 'life-time transcending interests' (Thompson 2009). We inherit identity from our parents (whether genetic or not) and subsequently pass on identity to our offspring.…”

Our obligations to future generations: the limits of intergenerational justice and the necessity of the ethics of metaphysics

“…So for instance, when Thompson (2012) writes of lifetime-transcending interests and attempts to 'establish that they play an important role in the lives of individuals and the formation of their identities, ' (35-36) her argument 'concentrates on two ideas: that lifetime-transcending interests are essential for a meaningful life and that they are a pre-requisite for making a rational plan of life' (36). Following Partridge, she claims that '"self-transcendence", as he calls it, gives meaning to our lives and projects, especially when we face the fact of our own mortality, ' (36) and she attempts to strengthen Partridge's point by arguing that even those individuals who do not have lifetime-transcending interests are 'riding piggyback on the lifetime-transcending interests of others' (36).…”

Should there be future people? A fundamental question for climate change and intergenerational justice

“…One very popular and influential way of thinking about the issue of what, if anything, currently living people ought to do with respect to climate change, is to conceptualize the problem in terms of intergenerational justice. There is by now a well developed and flourishing literature devoted to exactly this attempt, [10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20] as there is skepticism about its applicability. [21][22][23][24] It is beyond the scope of this article to summarize either the literature or the skepticism, but the point I want to make here is that these attempts to use intergenerational justice to think through what we ought to do about climate change are generally concerned with the agent-affecting consequences of climate change.…”