2004
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2004.07.004
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Identifying endogenous fiscal policy rules for macroeconomic models

Abstract: Non-technical summary 1 Introduction 2 The government budget constraint and the need of fiscal rules 2.1 Standard practice to obtain fiscal closure in large-scale macroeconomic models 2.1.1 The adjusting budgetary item 2.1.2 The functional form and the calibration 3 Identifying endogenous fiscal rules 3.1 Developing intuition via a basic macro model 3.1.1 The model 3.1.2 Characterising the stable manifold of the model 3.1.3 Computing an explicit model-based rule 3.2 Generalisation of the discussion in linear m… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…First, the results relate to the literature on fiscal closure rules, as typically used in large scale macroeconomic models. In this literature it is widely understood that different instruments, when residually used to enforce the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, lead to different dynamic outcomes which preclude simple comparisons across simulations, as discussed in Bryant and Zhang (1996), Mitchell et al (2000), and Pérez and Hiebert (2002). Yet, by construction, this literature offers few explicit analytical findings and we are not aware of a systematic discussion of the role of government debt in this context.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%
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“…First, the results relate to the literature on fiscal closure rules, as typically used in large scale macroeconomic models. In this literature it is widely understood that different instruments, when residually used to enforce the intertemporal budget constraint of the government, lead to different dynamic outcomes which preclude simple comparisons across simulations, as discussed in Bryant and Zhang (1996), Mitchell et al (2000), and Pérez and Hiebert (2002). Yet, by construction, this literature offers few explicit analytical findings and we are not aware of a systematic discussion of the role of government debt in this context.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…After linearizing (30) and substituting out the relevant terms in the three systems, it is clear that a switch from a representation in π b −π k −space to a representation in h b − h k −space amounts to another affine transformation, leaving, again, the results of Propositions 1 − 4 unaffected.…”
Section: Alternative Representations Of the Debt Targeting Rulementioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is found that Sri Lankan data does not support the simple tax difference rules proposed by Mitchell et al (2000) and Perez and Hiebert (2004). This implies that in Sri Lanka the tax rate does not respond significantly to either debt or deficit alone.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 80%
“…In light of the publicly available versions of the IMF's MULTIMOD model, Mitchell et al (2000) and Perez and Hiebert (2004) specify a general form of tax difference rule that targets debt as a percent of GDP, as follows:…”
Section: Tax Difference Rule Reacting To Debtmentioning
confidence: 99%
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