Ideas for Stories

Everett, Anthony; Schroeder, Timothy

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198735595.003.0012

Cited by 27 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This is merely pretend‐presupposed: when we look at what they are really about (and hence the truth‐makers for the claims we make with them) we do not find the referents they appear to pick out . We find instead “ideas for fictional characters” (Everett & Schroeder ()) or representations thereof in fictional texts . I thus understand (3), (8) and (9) as genuine assertions, whose truth is grounded on the pretenses thereof in textual and paratextual uses of sentences like (7).…”

Section: Fictional Discourses: Realism and Irrealismmentioning

confidence: 79%

“… I do not mean to suggest that realists have not taken up this challenge. Thomasson (, 90‐91) makes a proposal for her created‐abstract‐object form of realism compatible with my account in §7 below; something similar could be invoked on behalf of Priest's () Meinongian proposal, and Everett & Schroeder () elaborate on how their brand of moderate realism deals with it. …”

mentioning

confidence: 75%

“…Everett & Schroeder (, 289‐91) point out that irrealists about metatextual discourse are in the same boat, for variations on the questions raised here for realists can be legitimately posed to them. I fully agree; §8 will discharge this burden.…”

Section: The (Realist‐)cart and The (Pretend‐)horsementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names

García‐Carpintero

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Stacie Friend raises a problem of "co-identification" involving fictional names such as 'Hamlet' or 'Odysseus': how to explain judgments that different uses of these names are "about the same object", on the assumption of irrealism about fictional characters on which such expressions do not refer. To deal with this issue, she contrasts a Kripke-inspired "name-centric" approach, pursued among others by Sainsbury, with an Evans-inspired "info-centric" approach, which she prefers. The approach is motivated by her rejection of descriptivist ways of dealing with the problem. In this paper, I rely on the presuppositional, referencefixing form of descriptivism I favor for the semantics of names, and I explain how it helps us deal with Friend's problem, which I take to concern primarily the semantic contribution of names to ascriptions of representational content to fictions. The result is a form of the "name-centric" sort of approach that Friend rejects, which can (I'll argue) stand her criticisms.

show abstract

Section: Fictional Discourses: Realism and Irrealismmentioning

confidence: 79%

mentioning

confidence: 75%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names

García‐Carpintero

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The closest antecedents to my view are anti-realist views like one of the views outlined in Everett and Schroeder (2015). Everett and Schroeder introduce the notion of an 'idea' which they argue can usefully be invoked both by realists and 'irrealists' about fictional characters.…”

Section: The Role and The Candidatesmentioning

confidence: 83%

Fictional Characters and Characterisations

Connolly¹

2022

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Realists about fictional characters posit a certain theoretical role and a candidate to fill this role. I will delineate the role realists take fictional characters like Emma Woodhouse to fill, and I will argue that it is better filled by what I will call 'characterisations'. In explaining what I mean by 'characterisations',Iw i l l show that the existence of these entities is comparatively uncontroversial. Realists should acknowledge their existence, but doing so, I will argue, obviates the need to acknowledge the existence of Emma and other fictional individuals. 1

show abstract

“…For while it might be tempting to follow Locke in taking ideas to be abstract, non‐physical, and “invisible” things (Locke , III.2.1), a better proposal as to their ontological nature exists. According to Anthony Everett and Timothy Schroeder (), ideas are not abstracta but physical entities, namely, spatially discontinuous systems of token contentful mental states. Wesley Cray argues that this latter approach is more attractive, since it makes it easier for us to explain how ideas can be created, publically accessible, and causally efficacious and have “dynamic lives” (for example, be capable of being spread or forgotten; Cray , 237).…”

Section: The Ontology Of Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

In Advance of the Broken Theory: Philosophy and Contemporary Art

Irvin

Dodd

2017

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We discuss how analysis of contemporary artworks has shaped philosophical theories about the concept of art, the ontology of art, and artistic media. The rapid expansion, during the contemporary period, of the kinds of things that can count as artworks has prompted a shift toward procedural definitions, which focus on how artworks are selected, and away from definitions that focus exclusively on artworks’ features or effects. Some contemporary artworks challenge the traditional art–ontological dichotomy between physical particulars and repeatable entities whose occurrences are physical particulars. And nontraditional techniques and materials employed in contemporary art violate the boundaries of conventional media, prompting a rethinking of what artistic medium might be.

show abstract

Ideas for Stories

Cited by 27 publications

References 0 publications

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names

Co‐Identification and Fictional Names

Fictional Characters and Characterisations

In Advance of the Broken Theory: Philosophy and Contemporary Art

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About