SUMMARYMulti-proxy signature is one of the useful primitives of the proxy signature. Till now, only a few schemes of identity-based multi-proxy signature (IBMPS) have been proposed using bilinear pairings, but most of the schemes are insecure or lack a formal security proof. Because of the important application of IBMPS scheme in distributed systems, grid computing, and so on , construction of an efficient and provable-secure IBMPS scheme is desired. In 2005, Li & Chen proposed an IBMPS scheme from bilinear pairings, but their paper lacks a formal model and proof of the security. Further, in 2009, Cao & Cao presented an IBMPS scheme with the first formal security model for it. Unfortunately, their scheme is not secure against the Xiong et al's attack. In this paper, first, we present an IBMPS scheme, then we formalize a security model for the IBMPS schemes and prove that the presented scheme is existential unforgeable against adaptive chosen message and identity attack in the random oracle model under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Also, our scheme is not vulnerable for the Xiong et al's attack. The presented scheme is more efficient in the sense of computation and operation time than the existing IBMPS schemes.