I—Wlodek Rabinowicz: Incommensurability and Vagueness

Rabinowicz, Włodek

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2009.00173.x

Cited by 33 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 21 publications

(7 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Parfit famously explained variations of a paradox involving mere addition and considered the possibility that one may be able to avoid the paradox if two states of the world are 'roughly comparable' (Parfit 1984: 431-2). In this paper I restrict my discussion to two views of mere addition (see Qizilbash 2005Qizilbash , 2007aQizilbash , 2007bRabinowicz 2009a) which are related to Parfit's discussion and invoke the relation of 'parity' first advanced by Ruth Chang (see Chang 2002aChang , 2002bChang , 2005Qizilbash 2002;Gert 2004;Hsieh 2005;Peterson 2007;Rabinowicz 2009b;Carlson 2010b;Gustafsson 2011aGustafsson , 2011b.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Parity and the Intuition of Neutrality

Qizilbash¹

2017

Economics and Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:On parity views of mere addition if someone (or a group of people) is added to the world at a range of well-being levels – or ‘neutral range’ – leaving existing people unaffected, addition is on a par with the initial situation. Two distinct parity views – ‘rough equality’ and fitting-attitudes views – defend the ‘intuition of neutrality’. The first can be interpreted or adjusted so that it can rebut John Broome's objection that the neutral range is wide. The two views respond in distinct ways to two of Broome's other objections. Both views can, nonetheless, be plausibly defended against these objections.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Parity and the Intuition of Neutrality

Qizilbash¹

2017

Economics and Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As Rabinowicz (, p. 80, n. 16) notes, this only proves that it cannot be the case that there determinately holds such a relation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Ruth Chang () first presented the structure of the counterexample, and Erik Carlson (, ) then argued more forcefully for the point. Wlodek Rabinowicz () presented the objection in a different setting, and both Johan E. Gustafsson () and Luke Elson () then developed it further.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

A More Plausible Collapsing Principle

Andersson¹,

Herlitz

2018

Theoria

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In 1997 John Broome presented the Collapsing Argument that was meant to establish that non‐conventional comparative relations (e.g., “parity,” “imprecise equality,” “incommensurability”) cannot exist. Broome's argument has faced a lot of scrutiny and a certain type of counterexample has been used to undermine it. Most of the counterexamples focus on the Collapsing Principle which plays a central role in Broome's argument. In this article we will take a closer look at the most common type of counterexample and propose how to adjust the Collapsing Principle in order to avoid objections based on these counterexamples. We argue that a weaker version of the Collapsing Principle is not susceptible to the classical counterexamples. Furthermore, after an explorative discussion about the intuitions behind the original principle, we show that this weaker formulation is at least as intuitive as the principle suggested by Broome.

show abstract

“…According to the Fitting-Attitude Analysis of value (FA-analysis, for short), to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a proattitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I suggested a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value (Rabinowicz 2008(Rabinowicz , 2012see also 2009a, 2009b. In this paper, I first recapitulate this proposal (Section 1) and then move on (in Section 2) to suggest that one might adopt a structurally analogous analysis of probability.…”

mentioning

confidence: 97%

From values to probabilities

Rabinowicz

2015

Synthese

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to the Fitting-Attitude Analysis of value (FA-analysis), to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I proposed a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value (Rabinowicz 2008, 2009a, 3009b, 2013). In this paper, I first recapitulate the value modelling and then move on to suggest adopting a structurally similar analysis of probability. Indeed, many probability theorists from Poisson onwards did adopt an analysis of this kind. This move allows to formally model probability and probability relations in essentially the same way as value and value relations. One of the advantages of the model is that we get a new account of Keynesian incommensurable probabilities, which goes beyond Keynes in distinguishing between different types of incommensurability. It also becomes possible to draw a clear distinction between incommensurability and vagueness (indeterminacy) in probability comparisons.

show abstract

I—Wlodek Rabinowicz: Incommensurability and Vagueness

Cited by 33 publications

References 21 publications

On Parity and the Intuition of Neutrality

On Parity and the Intuition of Neutrality

A More Plausible Collapsing Principle

From values to probabilities

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About