Why We Shouldn't Swallow Worm Slices: A Case Study in Semantic Accommodation

Abstract

A radical metaphysical theory typically comes packaged with a semantic theory that reconciles those radical claims with common sense. The metaphysical theory says what things exist and what their natures are, while the semantic theory specifies, in terms of these things, how we are to interpret everyday language. Thus may we "think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar." This semantic accommodation of common sense, however, can end up undermining the very theory it is designed to protect. This paper is a case study, showing in detail how one popular version of temporal parts theory is self-undermining. This raises the specter that the problem generalizes to other metaphysical theories.The traditional flavor of temporal parts theory, Worm Theory, claims that everyday objects are four-dimensional space-time worms. An alternative flavor, Slice Theory, claims that objects are not space-time worms but are instead momentary slices of these worms. The differences, we find, are not nearly as great as advertised. In fact, the differences in the two metaphysical theories are entirely masked by compensating differences in the accompanying semantic theories. As a result, the two theories generate exactly the same truth conditions. Common sense says that I was born years ago. Slice Theory adopts a semantic theory that accommodates such claims, but in doing so, it also endorses the claim that I, like other everyday objects, persist and thus do not exist for a mere moment. That is, the metaphysical claims constitutive of Slice Theory are denied by the very semantic theory Slice Theory adopts to accommodate common sense. Slice Theory thus undermines itself.Metaphysicians make many claims that at least appear to fly in the face of common sense. "Only ideas exist!" "Only simples exist!" "Many objects occupy exactly the same place at a time!" Quite often, however, they C

Recruitment: A Problem of Entangled Temporal Parts

“…While perdurantists consider things have temporal part slices, each existing at a different time (as long as things are worms composed of related slices, i.e., identity of things can be ad-dressed at particular [synchronic] or multiple [diachronic] times), supporters of slice theory consider things are not the worms but rather the slices of those worms themselves. We note however that semantic 'common sense' accommodation of slice theory has been shown to make it inconsistent and has challenged its validity in favor of the classical perdurantist view [50].…”

Stage theory and proper names

“…My suggestion is that this should be done by preserving two orthodox views about proper names: first, the view that proper names are not context sensitive -that they refer to the An account like the one presented here is discussed but not endorsed by Moyer (2008). But Before exploring the most problematic consequences of BSV, let me just mention some attractive features of it.…”

Counting Stages

“…2 It is worth noting that although it is sometimes stated that both theories accept the same fundamental ontology, e.g. by Moyer [2008] and Moss [2012: x1], this is not built into the theories: stage theorists can deny that space-time worms exist, worm theorists cannot. even before fission.…”

“…A number of theorists have argued that intuitions about such sentences favour worm theory over stage theory [Hawley 2001;Sider 2001, unpubl. ms.;Moyer 2008;Moss 2012]. These theorists accept that stage theory does better than worm theory at explaining intuitions about sentences involving synchronic counting (i.e.…”