Vagueness, Multiplicity and Parts

Abstract

When do objects form a whole? Pre-theoretically we are inclined to think that sometimes objects are parts of a larger object-pages are parts of a book, fingers are parts of a hand, and also parts of people. Other sets of objects we are somewhat inclined to think do not form a whole-your fingers and my palm do not make up an object in the way that my fingers and my palm do. Some dust in the Andromeda galaxy and some rock from the centre of Mt Everest do not present themselves as part of a whole in the way that, for example, the cells of an individual redwood tree do.So much for how things seem on first blush. We can try to improve our grasp of which things make up objects and which do not in various ways-we can assemble a range of judgements about what is part of what and see if there are interesting underlying generalisations, we can see how questions of what is part of what fit into other questions we are concerned about (what a person or an artifact is, for example, or theories of creation and destruction). We can take into account unexpected empirical discoveries (when we discovered the atomic nature of objects like trees or rocks or ourselves, with atoms being separated from each other by many atom's diameters, we became less inclined to think objects must be in contact in order for them to make up a whole). We can think about how to apply the concepts of part and whole outside the main areas they were initially applied-we can see what happens when we try to apply them to space, or time, or sets, or numbers, or meanings, or events. And we can take into account theoretical virtues such as simplicity and unificatory power, preferring simple powerful theories to gerrymandered, ad-hoc-seeming generalisations or to mere collections of data points. There may be other channels of investigation as well. In short, we can do metaphysics. 1

The contingency of composition

“…43 It's worth pointing out that it's doubtful that the Lewis-Sider argument establishes even this much. Nolan (2006) argues, to my mind convincingly, vague intuitions concerning composition could be served by the positing of a sharp boundary. 44 This is Lewis' story: ''Restrict quantifiers, not composition.''…”

No Time, No Wholes: A Temporal and Causal-Oriented Approach to the Ontology of Wholes

“…According to Merrick's main argument, an object does not exist since it is causally overdetermined by its microphysical constituents. Although I share his view that mereological ''essentialism is false'' (Merrick 2001, The above plus another entity that interacts with two blobs as a whole…”

“…In order to better flesh out the suggested proposal, it is useful to show how the suggested criterion for unity could come apart from a few related views: first I will consider Trenton Merrick's eliminativist view and Peter Inwagen's view (Van Inwagen 1990;Merrick 2001) and then I will devote a few words regarding David Lewis' Universalism (Lewis 1986). I will start considering Merrick's eliminativism.…”

“…'mereological sum ', 'natural unit', or 'fusion' (Simons 1987;Nolan 2006) or simply a thing or an object (Van Inwagen 1990;Merrick 2001). I refer to a scattered collection of elements as an 'arbitrary sum'.…”

Against the Vagueness Argument

“…Trenton Merricks (2001Merricks ( , 2005Merricks ( , 2007 and Daniel Nolan (2006) have questioned its validity (for different reasons). In this paper I will offer a counterexample to the vagueness argument by developing an idea put forward by Merricks, namely that there is a clear sense in which there can be a sharp cut-off point in a composition continuum.…”