<i>Transco plc v Glasgow City Council</i>: Developing Enrichment Law after <i>Shilliday</i>

Whitty, Niall R

doi:10.3366/elr.2006.10.1.113

Cited by 3 publications

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“…165 As Gloag and Henderson recognise, "[i]f somebody does something for his own benefit which also incidentally confers a benefit on another, the former probably suffer[s] no relevant loss; the latter's benefit does not cause him any extra expenditure". 166 Similarly, Professor Whitty notes that "[a]n important reason of principle underlying the 'incidental benefit' doctrine is that in providing such a benefit, the pursuer incurs no additional loss or expense", 167 and Sellar goes so far as to say that such cases are "covered by the well-accepted requirements of enrichment, impoverishment [and] a causal connection between" the two. 168 The denial of restitution for incidental benefit is also explained with reference to the lack of correlative loss in the line of authority establishing this principle.…”

Section: Three Kinds Of Incidental Benefitmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Double Ceiling on Unjust Enrichment: Old Solutions for Old Problems

Trotter¹

2017

C.L.J.

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Unjust enrichment is not calculated to strip defendants of gain at all costs, but rather to restore to the claimant the value or rights he has unjustly lost. It can therefore only justify restitution to the extent of the claimant's ultimate expense, or the defendant's ultimate enrichment, whichever is lesser. Although that “double ceiling” has not found favour (at least in England), this article defends it against perceived inconsistencies with principle and precedent, and proposes it as a solution to three unresolved doctrinal problems in the law of unjust enrichment: claims for improvements to property, subjective overvaluation and incidental benefits.

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Section: Three Kinds Of Incidental Benefitmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Double Ceiling on Unjust Enrichment: Old Solutions for Old Problems

Trotter¹

2017

C.L.J.

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“…CreditCorp Ltd [1994] 1 All ER 470 (HL) 473-474. For subsidiarity in Scots law see, among others, Hogg (2006) and Witty (2006).…”

Section: Conceptual Analysis 21 What Is Generally Understood By Subsidiarity?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The subsidiarity rule: the unjust enrichment doctrine in construction law

Jorge

2013

International Journal of Law in the Built Environment

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Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the subsidiarity rule in unjust enrichment and challenge some of its theoretical foundations and its unqualified application in unjust enrichment law as a whole. Design/methodology/approach -The paper uses a comparative approach with South African and Brazilian laws as the main reference points, but it extends the analysis to common-law jurisdictions elsewhere. It explores the extent and limits of the applicability of the rule in claims arising from the built environment. It analyses the interaction between the subsidiarity rule and the defence of change of position. Findings -It concludes that, in three party cases, subcontractors may be able to use enrichment actions against owners to obtain an adequate redress. The exclusion of enrichment claims where there is a consensual distribution of risks and rewards normatively operates to validate any transferred benefit and eliminates any prospective normative gain or loss. However, policy-based claims for unjust enrichment can be made even in the presence of such bargains. Originality/value -The paper pioneers the analysis of subsidiarity rule in the specific context of the built environment. It presents an original examination of the interaction between the subsidiarity rule and change of position defence.

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Subsidiarity in Private Law?

Campbell

2020

Edinburgh Law Review

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This is the first English language paper seriously to examine the meaning of subsidiarity from the perspective of private law, in which it might be used to understand legal rules, or the interaction of different kinds of claim. Since there are so few relevant sources in English, this article casts a wide net for consensus. It offers six propositions about what it means to designate a rule or relationship (between legal regimes, say) as one of subsidiarity. These are formulated by reference, principally, to thinking about subsidiarity outwith private law; and, secondarily, to (i) miscellaneous literature about subsidiarity, (ii) the general French private law literature about subsidiarity, and (iii) what little can be gleaned from relevant unjust enrichment discourse in English. The state of play in that discourse is summarised, before the choice of Roman Catholic social teaching, European Union law, and European human rights law as settings to examine for their conceptions of subsidiarity is explained, and subsidiarity in each of these contexts is sketched out. Succeeding sections then outline each proposition, and clarify how it may be derived from the sources. The paper concludes by reflecting guardedly on the potential of subsidiarity in private law, as a way to model the interrelation of private law claims and doctrines.

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Transco plc v Glasgow City Council: Developing Enrichment Law after Shilliday

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

The Double Ceiling on Unjust Enrichment: Old Solutions for Old Problems

The Double Ceiling on Unjust Enrichment: Old Solutions for Old Problems

The subsidiarity rule: the unjust enrichment doctrine in construction law

Subsidiarity in Private Law?

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