The Contemporary Presidency: Unity in the Executive and the Presidential Succession Act

Abstract

The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 was passed to make the solution to the problem of a double vacancy in the presidency and vice presidency more democratic. The current law, however, privileges “democracy” at the expense of “energy” in the executive, especially as that energy is reflected in the unitary nature of the presidency. Hamilton explains in Federalist no. 70 why unity in the executive is important, both for the purposes of energetic leadership and accountability. The possibility that a successor under the 1947 statute could be from a party other than that elected by the people diminishes the energy that is key to this branch of government. This article explores the central constitutional question surrounding the issue of double vacancy: whether the current law meets the two goals of providing for the possibility of a double vacancy while still retaining the energy that typifies the office of the presidency.

Smith (and Jones) Go to Washington: Democracy and Vice-Presidential Selection

“…As vice president, Jefferson played little role in the executive branch and did not support the Adams' presidency (Wilmerding 1953). 7 Given that the two were of different parties, some worried that the situation could, at worst, give rise to a coup d'état, and, at best, diminish the energy needed in a unitary executive branch (Crockett 2004).…”

“…To address these deficiencies, the 12th Amendment created separate ballots for president and vice president. This would ensure that presidential candidates could not tie with their vice-presidential running mate in the balloting (Crockett 2004). Additionally, to avoid the problems created by having a president of one party/ideology and a vice president of an opposing party/ideology, the drafters of the 12th Amendment intended presidential and vice-presidential running mates to run as pairs.…”

“…Additionally, to avoid the problems created by having a president of one party/ideology and a vice president of an opposing party/ideology, the drafters of the 12th Amendment intended presidential and vice-presidential running mates to run as pairs. This would, in their line of reasoning, unify the executive branch in the face of party divisions by having presidential and vice-presidential running mates of the same party and provide the “energy” and cohesiveness that Alexander Hamilton argued for in Federalist #70 (Crockett 2004; Wright 1996).…”

“…Research also addresses the role vice presidents play in administrations (Stevens 1996; Walch 1995), with an emphasis post-WWII (Pika 2010; Relyea 2010; Edwards and Jacobs 2008; Moe 2008; Goldstein 2008; Baumgartner 2008a; Kengor 2000a, 2000b, 1997; Light 1984a, 1984b). A body of legal research addresses the legal mechanisms providing for succession (McQueeney 2007; Kassop 2005; Crockett 2004). Researchers have also studied vice presidents' success at seeking the presidency in their own right (Kincade 2000; Murphy and Stuckey 2002; Mattei and Weisberg 1994; Jones 2008; Simonton 1985) and researchers have, after the fact, examined vice presidents' success at governing should they become president (Farrar-Myers 2007; Abbott 2005; Langston 2002; King and Riddlesperger 1995; Simonton 1981).…”