The Contemporary Presidency: Presidents Profiting from Disasters: Evidence of Presidential Distributive Politics

Abstract

In what ways do presidents engage in distributive politics? I study the effects of presidential electoral politics on the federal government's financial response to disasters. Specifically I ask whether swing states or safe states are more likely to receive additional disaster aid through presidentially ordered increases in the federal reimbursement rate for specific disasters. I examine four potential political factors affecting this distribution: swing states versus safe states, a president's base states versus the opposing party's base states, the presence of co-partisan presidents and governors, and the proximity of the next presidential election. I find that the effects vary by administration, with Bill Clinton not appearing to make partisan decisions in this way, while his successors include these factors when making the decisions. These findings demonstrate the presence of partisan political calculations in the distribution of disaster aid and also highlight differences in the ways power is handled in different presidential administrations.

How do you solve a problem like Maria? The politics of disaster response in Puerto Rico, Florida and Texas

“…Here, US politics incentivizes attention not to a collective good but rather to groups that either are very loyal (and thus key parts of party coalitions) or groups that might defect to another party (and thereby attract political attention). This incentive structure or pattern of participation in distributive politics is well documented, especially in regard to “disaster gerrymandering” by at‐risk states, competing with one another with negative consequences for less‐well resourced, at‐risk states (Maffioli et al, 2017; Platt, 1999; Salkowe & Chakraborty, 2009; Stramp, 2013; Sylves & Búzás, 2007).…”