Risk Communication and Risky Choice in Context

Abstract

This chapter takes a synthetic approach to six related lines of research on decision making at risk and views risky choice as a function of cue use with priorities in the context of risk communication. An evolutionary analysis of risk and risk communication is presented in which risk is defined not only as variance in monetary payoff but also as variance in biological relatedness, social relations, and ultimately in reproductive fitness. Empirical evidence of ecological and social significance embedded in risk messages is analyzed, and how these risk cues affect behavioral decision making is examined. A new explanatory framework, the ambiguity and ambivalence hypothesis, identifies two key preconditions contributing to inconsistency and biases in making risky choices as a result of cue use in the course of risk communication.

How Can Group Experience Influence the Cue Priority? A Re-Examination of the Ambiguity-Ambivalence Hypothesis

“…As mentioned in the introduction, while the absence of the framing effect appears to be stable in experiments using university student samples (Wang and Johnston, 1995; Wang, 1996a,b,c, 2008; Wang et al, 2001; Bloomfield, 2006; Zhang and Miao, 2008), this is not the case for experiments using the general public (Shimizu and Udagawa, 2011). However, if decision-making is influenced by acquired elements, such as group experience in real life, the general public may have a different cue priority from students.…”

“…The ambiguity–ambivalence hypothesis (Wang, 1996a, 2008) aims to systematically explain the disappearance of the framing effect. This hypothesis, drawing on evolutionary concepts, proposes the following assumptions: “(1) Decision cues are selected and used in accordance to their priorities.…”

“…(3) Primary cues in risk communication carry evolutionary, ecological, and social significance and anchor decision reference points, while secondary cues of verbal communication fine-tune the settings of reference points. (4) Inconsistent decision biases tend to occur as a result of secondary cue use when primary cues are absent in risk communication (i.e., an ambiguity condition) or when primary cues elicit conflicting preferences (i.e., an ambivalence condition)” (Wang, 2008, p. 82).…”

“…However there is little agreement as to the reasons for this sensitivity. The “ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis” (Wang, 2008) aims to systematically explain the sensitivity of this effect by paying particular attention to people’s cue priority: it states that the framing effect occurs when verbal framing is used to compensate for the absence of higher prioritized decision cues. The main purpose of our study is to examine and develop this hypothesis by examining cue priority given differences in people’s “group experience.” The main result is that the framing effect is absent when the choice problem is presented in a group context that reflects the actual size of the group that the participant has had experience with.…”

Multiple Framing: Verbal, Facial, and Vocal Cues in Risky Choice

“…Hypothesis 2 addresses cue congruency effects. Based upon the AA hypothesis, verbal framing would be most effective when other cues are absent, incongruent, and/or ambiguous (Wang, ). Thus, we predict more evident framing effects when the valence of facial and vocal cues is incongruent with the verbal frame (e.g., positive framing accompanied with at least one negative facial expression or tone of voice, and vice versa).…”