1974
DOI: 10.1017/s0022216x00008312
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La Violencia Revisited: the Clientelist Bases of Political Violence in Colombia

Abstract: Lying at the heart of the problem in analyzing Colombian violence is the relative poverty of conceptual frameworks not only for dealing with violence but with the institutions and processes and traditions which form the social environment of the society. In the following pages I shall argue that a dialectic between violence and patron-client relations offers a useful analytical framework. The first part will deal with the historical dynamics of Colombian politics. In part two, patron-client politics will be lo… Show more

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Cited by 29 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…Sobresale una respuesta en la que los autores dejan de creer en que el Estado resulte de intenciones voluntarias de grupos e individuos, para creer en que en cambio de una causa, el Estado es una consecuencia de otro "fenómeno" que denominan "sistema nacional". Entienden este último como la cristalización particular nacional de un conjunto de fuerzas "invisibles" que actúa de acuerdo con direcciones mundiales timoneadas "autónomamente" por la economía de mercados y sin comandancia humana (Arocha, 1979;Bejarano, 1983;Bergquist, 1995;Caballero, 1976;Colectivo Proletarización, 1975;Fajardo, 1984;Henderson, 1985;Jaramillo, 1982;Medina, 1980;Merchán, 1975;Oquist, 1978;Ortiz, 1985;Palacios, 2002;Pecaut, 1987;Sánchez y Meertens, 1983;Sánchez, 1987;Schmidt, 1974;Urrutia, 1969;Zuleta, 1975).…”
Section: Estado Revivido: Literatura Publicada Entre 1974 Y 1989unclassified
“…Sobresale una respuesta en la que los autores dejan de creer en que el Estado resulte de intenciones voluntarias de grupos e individuos, para creer en que en cambio de una causa, el Estado es una consecuencia de otro "fenómeno" que denominan "sistema nacional". Entienden este último como la cristalización particular nacional de un conjunto de fuerzas "invisibles" que actúa de acuerdo con direcciones mundiales timoneadas "autónomamente" por la economía de mercados y sin comandancia humana (Arocha, 1979;Bejarano, 1983;Bergquist, 1995;Caballero, 1976;Colectivo Proletarización, 1975;Fajardo, 1984;Henderson, 1985;Jaramillo, 1982;Medina, 1980;Merchán, 1975;Oquist, 1978;Ortiz, 1985;Palacios, 2002;Pecaut, 1987;Sánchez y Meertens, 1983;Sánchez, 1987;Schmidt, 1974;Urrutia, 1969;Zuleta, 1975).…”
Section: Estado Revivido: Literatura Publicada Entre 1974 Y 1989unclassified
“…With uneven economic growth plaguing the nation, the assassination of the Liberal Jorge Gaitán, in 1948 marked the beginning of the violent conflict known in Colombia simply as La Violencia: during this period 200,000 people lost their lives, mostly in rural areas (Oquist 1978;Wickham-Crowley 1993). Scholars have often linked the period of violence to a conflict between the two political parties (Sánchez and Meertens 2001;Schmidt 1974), although these accounts omit the level of tension in rural areas, due to high levels of poverty and an unequal distribution of land (Oquist 1978;Zamosc 1986;LeGrand 1986). The eminent historian on Colombia,…”
Section: The 1950s and Rising Rural Conflictmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In their cases, clients were mobilized to blockade major highways, loot small businesses, and even burn down part of a poor neighborhood to send a message about territorial control. Patronage networks have also been found to be important in mobilizing contentious action in Indonesia (Kalyvas, 2003), Colombia (Schmidt, 1974), and Japan (Broadbent, 1999). As Auyero et al (2009, p. 12) write, 'Wellfunctioning patronage networks can be purposively activated to conduct politics by other collective (and sometimes violent) means'.…”
Section: Extra-legal Mobilization As Investment In (De)mobilizing Netmentioning
confidence: 99%