Episodic Simulation of Future Events

Abstract

This article focuses on the neural and cognitive processes that support imagining or simulating future events, a topic that has recently emerged in the forefront of cognitive neuroscience. We begin by considering concepts of simulation from a number of areas of psychology and cognitive neuroscience in order to place our use of the term in a broader context. We then review neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and cognitive studies that have examined future-event simulation and its relation to episodic memory. This research supports the idea that simulating possible future events depends on much of the same neural machinery, referred to here as a core network, as does remembering past events. After discussing several theoretical accounts of the data, we consider applications of work on episodic simulation for research concerning clinical populations suffering from anxiety or depression. Finally, we consider other aspects of future-oriented thinking that we think are related to episodic simulation, including planning, prediction, and remembering intentions. These processes together comprise what we have termed "the prospective brain," whose primary function is to use past experiences to anticipate future events.

Selection of preconfigured cell assemblies for representation of novel spatial experiences

“…Bilateral removal of the hippocampus to alleviate untreatable epilepsy left patient H.M. with a severe form of anterograde amnesia [8], a case that first indicated the role of the hippocampus in the formation of new memories. Interestingly, the same patients that suffer from anterograde amnesia following bilateral hippocampal dysfunction are deficient in their ability to imagine new experiences [3,4,9], indicating that the same brain structure is necessary to internally represent past as well as future experiences. Furthermore, electrophysiological recordings of neuronal ensemble activity from the rodent hippocampus showed a similar pattern of temporal firing sequences during exploratory run and during subsequent periods of rapid eye movement sleep [10] which are associated with dreaming in human [11].…”

“…The most common form of internally generated representation occurs when our mind travels back in time into our past as is the case with episodic memory retrieval [2]. Other types of internally generated representations are projections into the future and take the form of imagining [1,3,4]. Probably the most genuine form of internally generated representation occurs during sleep, particularly during dreaming, when the brain is virtually disconnected from the external world.…”

Memory Retrieval in Mice and Men

“…Retrieval, prospection, and theory of mind tasks all activated similar default mode regions, including multiple prefrontal, parietal, and temporal regions. The abundance of evidence linking episodic retrieval to mental construction or simulation of future/fictitious events Maguire 2007, 2009;Schacter and Addis 2007;Schacter et al 2008;Buckner 2010;Rabin et al 2010;Szpunar 2010;Viard et al 2012) has led to a renewed emphasis on the constructive nature of memory (Bartlett 1932).…”

The evolution of stories: from mimesis to language, from fact to fiction

“…The network might be better named the actor–scene or scenario network, since it supports not only autobiographical recall but also thinking about the minds and personalities71 of others, as well as future scenes84 involving self and others 78, 79, 80, 85, 86, 87. Much of the cognitive neuroscientific research on this network has focused on autobiographical memory and imagination,88 on constructive episodic memory as the basis for future episodic simulation (‘the ability to flexibly recombine elements of past experience into simulations of novel future events’),78, 85, 86, 89 and on the social imagination engaged in fiction 90, 91, 92. But philosopher Derek Matravers rightly notes that we need imagination to understand factual narrative as much as fiction;93 and Dor, as we have seen, points out that we need imagination even to understand language—but he would probably agree that we have a specially swift and responsive imagination when we attend to verbal narrative.…”