Abstract:The United States has fallen well behind worldwide trends in presidential elections. Its electoral college regionalizes the contest for the national executive, contrary to a worldwide trend toward direct election. U.S. states continue to select presidential electors via plurality rule, resulting in vulnerability to third‐party “spoilers,” even at a time when third‐party voting is on the upswing. The worldwide trend is toward runoffs to guard against spoilers. Only in nomination methods is the United States the… Show more
“…The president is directly elected by popular vote (instead of an electoral college) in a majority rule system with a runoff (i.e., a second round). With the exception of the United States, every presidential regime across the globe employs a direct electoral rule (Shugart (2004), Blais et al (1997)). In Argentina, unless the winner of the first round obtains a qualified majority of 45% or a simple majority above 40% with a 10% winning margin, the first two candidates compete in a second round.…”
Section: Institutional Background and Datamentioning
We show that monitoring by individuals with preferences regarding the outcome of the supervised task interferes with the task's process: the monitors bias the results in favor of their own preferences. In particular, using an original dataset from the 2011 national elections in Argentina, we exploit a (quasi) natural experiment to show that electoral observers with partisan preferences cause a 1.7% to 7% increase in the vote count of the observers' preferred party. This bias, which appears under various electoral rules, concentrates in municipalities with lower civic capital (Guiso et al. (2010)) and weakens the accountability role of elections. * We thank the discussions, comments and suggestions from
“…The president is directly elected by popular vote (instead of an electoral college) in a majority rule system with a runoff (i.e., a second round). With the exception of the United States, every presidential regime across the globe employs a direct electoral rule (Shugart (2004), Blais et al (1997)). In Argentina, unless the winner of the first round obtains a qualified majority of 45% or a simple majority above 40% with a 10% winning margin, the first two candidates compete in a second round.…”
Section: Institutional Background and Datamentioning
We show that monitoring by individuals with preferences regarding the outcome of the supervised task interferes with the task's process: the monitors bias the results in favor of their own preferences. In particular, using an original dataset from the 2011 national elections in Argentina, we exploit a (quasi) natural experiment to show that electoral observers with partisan preferences cause a 1.7% to 7% increase in the vote count of the observers' preferred party. This bias, which appears under various electoral rules, concentrates in municipalities with lower civic capital (Guiso et al. (2010)) and weakens the accountability role of elections. * We thank the discussions, comments and suggestions from
“…Ta przewaga Gore'a wśród wyborców Nadera umożliwiłaby mu zwycięstwo na Florydzie, będącej krytycznym stanem dla uzyskania większości głosów elektorów (Herron i Lewis, 2007). Ponieważ w USA większość elektorów prezydenckich wybieranych jest metodą większości względnej, a wyborcy coraz częściej głosują na trzeciego kandydata spoza dwóch głównych partii, proces wyborczy staje się coraz bardziej wrażliwy na efekty spoilerów (Shugart, 2004).…”
Bibliografi i). Fragmenty tekstu wyjaśniające czytelnikowi anglojęzycznemu sprawy oczywiste dla czytelnika polskiego zostały skrócone. Według Nowego słownika ortografi cznego PWN zarówno słowo "spoiler", jak i "spojler" są poprawne i występują w kilku znaczeniach. Pierwszy z tych wariantów został wybrany ze względu na identyczną pisownię jak w języku angielskim.
“…More than twenty-five years later, this way of framing the nature of prime-ministerial leadership seems to have gone out of fashion. Instead, we hear more about 'prime-ministerial government' and 'presidentialization' (the latter term relying upon a largely misleading analogy with the power of heads of government in presidential systems, see Hart 1992; PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020.…”
Section: (P8) Understanding Prime-ministerial Performance: Power Chancesmentioning
This chapter characterizes the role of prime ministers as public leaders: of the government, their parties, and the nation. It reviews the current state of knowledge about prime ministers, signals its limitations and sets out the research agenda of the study. It argues that understanding and evaluating how prime ministers perform their leadership function requires delving into the interplay between personal, institutional and contextual factors. It maps out the design of the collaborative and comparative research project the remainder of the book reports on.
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