<i>Editorial Commentary:</i>Pandemic H5N1: Receding Risk or Coming Catastrophe?

Morens, David M.

doi:10.1093/cid/cit051

Cited by 12 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…The Chinese H7N9 virus has remained a low-pathogenicity virus to date; however, it is conceivable that if it spreads further in poultry, it may undergo a similar spontaneous mutational change to HPAI. Although HPAI viruses do not as a rule infect humans or cause severe human disease (10), large-scale culling of diseased poultry during HPAI outbreaks can create intense exposure situations for large numbers of people, potentially leading to human infections and even deaths in persons who may have specific but uncommon and as-yet-uncharacterized susceptibilities (4, 10, 14, 25). …”

Section: Poultry Pathogenicitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, the two avian viruses share a number of epidemiological features, as follows (4): both viruses have produced a characteristic clinical picture in humans that includes bilateral pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome, and multiorgan failure (1, 26); human cases have been rare but unusually severe and often fatal; large numbers of humans have apparently been exposed to both viruses without immunologically detectable or clinically apparent infection; person-to-person transmission has rarely if ever occurred; and although uncommon, case clusters seem to indicate common source exposures in persons who are genetically related. As appears to be the case for H5N1 (10, 25), H7N9 may be exhibiting features of a poorly adapted avian influenza virus that is now and may remain unable to infect humans easily but which is at the same time capable of causing severe disease in rare persons with as-yet-uncharacterized genetic susceptibilities (4, 10, 26). …”

Section: The H7n9 Epizootic Shares Epidemiological Similarities With mentioning

confidence: 99%

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H7N9 Avian Influenza A Virus and the Perpetual Challenge of Potential Human Pandemicity

Morens

Taubenberger

Fauci

2013

mBio

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The ongoing H7N9 influenza epizootic in China once again presents us questions about the origin of pandemics and how to recognize them in early stages of development. Over the past ~135 years, H7 influenza viruses have neither caused pandemics nor been recognized as having undergone human adaptation. Yet several unusual properties of these viruses, including their poultry epizootic potential, mammalian adaptation, and atypical clinical syndromes in rarely infected humans, suggest that they may be different from other avian influenza viruses, thus questioning any assurance that the likelihood of human adaptation is low. At the same time, the H7N9 epizootic provides an opportunity to learn more about the mammalian/human adaptational capabilities of avian influenza viruses and challenges us to integrate virologic and public health research and surveillance at the animal-human interface.

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Section: Poultry Pathogenicitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The H7n9 Epizootic Shares Epidemiological Similarities With mentioning

confidence: 99%

H7N9 Avian Influenza A Virus and the Perpetual Challenge of Potential Human Pandemicity

Morens

Taubenberger

Fauci

2013

mBio

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“…7,8 Debate has also arisen around the interpretation of seroepidemiologic studies of avian influenza A virus (AIV) infections of humans, given uncertainties about assay performance and antibody kinetics in exposed and unexposed populations. [9][10][11] In addition, new immunoassays and modifications of well-established assays are increasingly being used for the detection of influenza virus strainspecific antibodies. [12][13][14][15][16][17][18] These issues led to the formation in 2010 of the Consortium for the Standardization of Influenza Seroepidemiology (CONSISE).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

CONSISE statement on the reporting of Seroepidemiologic Studies for influenza (ROSES‐I statement): an extension of the STROBE statement

Horby

Laurie

Cowling

et al. 2016

Influenza Resp Viruses

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BackgroundPopulation‐based serologic studies are a vital tool for understanding the epidemiology of influenza and other respiratory viruses, including the early assessment of the transmissibility and severity of the 2009 influenza pandemic, and Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus. However, interpretation of the results of serologic studies has been hampered by the diversity of approaches and the lack of standardized methods and reporting.ObjectiveThe objective of the CONSISE ROSES ‐I statement was to improve the quality and transparency of reporting of influenza seroepidemiologic studies and facilitate the assessment of the validity and generalizability of published results.MethodsThe ROSES‐I statement was developed as an expert consensus of the CONSISE epidemiology and laboratory working groups. The recommendations are presented in the familiar format of a reporting guideline. Because seroepidemiologic studies are a specific type of observational epidemiology study, the ROSES‐I statement is built upon the STROBE guidelines. As such, the ROSES‐I statement should be seen as an extension of the STROBE guidelines.ResultsThe ROSES ‐I statement presents 42 items that can be used as a checklist of the information that should be included in the results of published seroepidemiologic studies, and which can also serve as a guide to the items that need to be considered during study design and implementation.ConclusionsWe hope that the ROSES‐I statement will contribute to improving the quality of reporting of seroepidemiologic studies.

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“…We do know that humans, who can be easily infected with avian influenza A viruses by experimental challenge, are naturally and repeatedly exposed to and often infected by many such avian viruses without generating pandemics — as evidenced by multiple epidemics and case clusters as well as by serosurveys. 3,4 …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As with H5N1, 3,4 in H7N9 these epidemiologic features may be signatures of a fundamentally poorly adaptable avian virus that nevertheless productively infects those rare humans with unidentified genetic susceptibilities, who are “found” by widespread poultry epizootics that expose large human populations. Conceivably, questions raised by H5N1 and H7N9 will be faced repeatedly as large-scale domestic poultry raising and transport, coupled with exploding human populations, create opportunities for any avian virus that encounters domestic poultry to expose large numbers of humans.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%