"I Don't Want Everybody to Vote": Christian Nationalism and Restricting Voter Access in the United States

Abstract

Though the persistence of voter suppression and disenfranchisement in the US is well-documented, we still know little about their contemporary ideological underpinnings beyond partisanship and racial resentment. Highlighting the Christian Right’s influence in driving anti-democratic sentiment in the post-Civil Rights era, we propose contemporary ideological support for restricting the vote generally, and specifically, to those who prove “worthy,” is undergirded by a pervasive ideology that cloaks authoritarian ethno-traditionalism with the ultimacy and polysemic utility of religious language―Christian nationalism. Nationally representative data collected weeks before the November 2020 elections reveal Christian nationalism is a leading predictor that Americans deny that voter suppression is a problem, believe that the US makes it “too easy to vote,” believe that voter fraud is rampant, and support measures to disenfranchise individuals who could not pass a basic civics test or who committed certain crimes. Interactions show Christian nationalism’s influence is particularly strong among men across most outcomes and, regarding voter suppression, whites compared to Blacks. We argue Christian nationalism seeks to institutionalize founding ideals in which civic participation is rooted in hierarchies, being restricted to a “worthy” few. Appeals to America’s religious heritage thus facilitate stratifying America’s citizenry and justifying restricting participation to preserve dominance.

What Isn’t Christian Nationalism? A Call for Conceptual and Empirical Splitting

“…We conclude by noting that although we have focused on theoretical and empirical concerns, the aims of prominent QCN literature are also explicitly normative. QCN scholars state that Christian nationalism is a threat to a pluralistic society that must be countered with a coordinated response (e.g., Perry et al 2022). We believe that establishing better delineated boundaries around the concept will serve this end.…”

“…Christian nationalism has been linked to, nonexhaustively, white supremacy, patriarchy, xenophobia, heteronormativity, authoritarianism, militarism (Whitehead and Perry 2020), rejection of science (Baker, Perry, and Whitehead 2020), small-government libertarianism, antiglobalist populism (Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs 2021), antidemocratic tendencies (Perry, Whitehead, and Grubbs 2022), social conservatism, Islamophobia, protofascism, and orientations toward cultural dominance (Whitehead and Perry 2020)—and this list continues to expand. QCN scholars argue that Christian nationalism is not only correlated with but shapes , drives , or undergirds these other attitudes (e.g., Perry, Whitehead, et al 2021; Perry et al 2022; Whitehead and Perry 2020). In some cases these claims go further, as when Whitehead and Perry (2020) wrote that Christian nationalism “ includes [italics added] assumptions of nativism, white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity along with divine sanctions for authoritarian control and militarism” (p. 10), thereby promoting these additional factors from outcomes to constitutive elements.…”

“…As a result, purported components of Christian nationalism not represented in empirical analyses are nonetheless invoked to help explain findings in QCN studies. For instance, authoritarianism is regularly identified as a feature of Christian nationalism and theorized to help explain the development of other attitudes (e.g., Perry, Whitehead, et al 2021; Perry et al 2022; Whitehead and Perry 2019), despite not being measured in the QCN scale or included as a predictor in most studies. 1 In this way, QCN scholarship “smuggles in” interpretive elements that are divorced from its empirical demonstrations.…”

“…It is characterized as lacking in theological orthodoxy (Perry et al 2022) but also representing “an ultra-conservative strain of Christianity” (Whitehead 2021). It is said to entail a narrative that idealizes the United States as “enshrining the highest moral virtues of liberty, justice, and equality; and heroically overcoming tyranny and establishing representative democracy to preserve the rights of individuals” (Perry, Cobb, et al 2021:7) but, more typically, to be “fundamentally anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic” (Perry et al 2022:8). These various claims are not necessarily irreconcilable but nonetheless point to a concept whose elasticity undermines both its plausibility and explanatory utility (Ermakoff 2017).…”

Misperceptions about out-partisans’ democratic values may erode democracy

“…For example, partisans may view democratic principles that they support as fungible and worth sacrificing for competing values, such as power. And for many segments of the population (e.g., White Christians), for whom increasing diversity threatens political power, there may be a newfound tension between pro-democratic views and pro-group views [35][36][37][38] . This broader context may also help to explain why a willingness to subvert ostensibly held democratic values was higher among Republicans.…”