<i>DE SE</i> PREFERENCES AND EMPATHY FOR FUTURE SELVES1

Paul, L. A.

doi:10.1111/phpe.12090

Cited by 17 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…He argues that we in fact do not and that our tendency to favour ourselves is the primordial case of love at first sight. Paul (2017aPaul ( , 2017b argues that there is a notion of empathy that is both essentially de se, and crucial to explaining our moral assessment and decision-makingbeing able to imaginatively project oneself into the first-person perspective of another.17 She also argues for a notion of self-understanding that is essentially de se. Titelbaum (2017) argues that facts about the outcomes of one's own reasoning processes may have a different evidential significance than facts about the outcomes of others.…”

Section: Scepticism About the Importance Of The De Sementioning

confidence: 99%

First-Person Thought

Morgan

Salje

2019

Analysis

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Section: Scepticism About the Importance Of The De Sementioning

confidence: 99%

First-Person Thought

Morgan

Salje

2019

Analysis

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“…I revise. After I move to the city, my preferences are constituted by my response to the lived experience of having a new job in a new city (Paul 2016(Paul , 2018Paul and Healy 2018).…”

Section: Transformative Experiencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…(She fails to meet conditions (1) and (2), depending on what one requires “knowledge” to involve: on our view, she can fail to know certain propositions because testimony is not available, or even when testimony is available, she can fail to know the de se truths these propositions concern, that is, she does not grasp the propositions in the right way, the way she needs to in order to decide and act. See Paul (2018) for discussion. )…”

Section: Rational Security and How It Failsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Real World Problems

Paul¹,

Quiggin²

2018

Episteme

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In the real world, there can be constraints on rational decision-making: there can be limitations on what I can know and on what you can know. There can also be constraints on my ability to deliberate or on your ability to deliberate. It is useful to know what the norms of rational deliberation should be in ideal contexts, for fully informed agents, in an ideal world. But it is also useful to know what the norms of rational deliberation should be in the actual world, in non-ideal contexts, for imperfectly informed agents, especially for big, life-changing decisions. That is, we want to know how to deliberate as best we can, given the real-world limitations on what we can know, and given real-world limitations on how we are able to deliberate. In this paper, our concern is with the norms of rational deliberation in certain, important, non-ideal contexts, where the reasoning occurs from the agent's first person, subjective point of view. The norms governing the process of deliberation for real people in the sorts of non-ideal contexts we'll consider need to reflect the way that real agents, with an incomplete grasp on the facts and an imperfect ability to deliberate, can be expected to proceed. Our central contention is that framing and exploring the deliberative process from the first person perspective allows us to uncover and explore important, real-world constraints on boundedly rational agents deliberating from the subjective perspective.

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“…Typically, though, empathy's morally relevant epistemic significance has been cashed out in terms of its contribution to our knowledge of other's mental states (see e.g. Matravers (2011), Ravenscroft (1998), Paul (2017)) and/or our formation of moral judgments (see e.g. Slote (2010), Kaupinnen (2017)).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding

Bailey

2020

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Empathy is a form of emotionally charged imaginative perspective‐taking. It is also the unique source of a particular form of understanding, which I will call humane understanding. Humane understanding consists in the direct apprehension of the intelligibility of others’ emotions. This apprehension is an epistemic good whose ethical significance is multifarious. In this paper, I focus on elaborating the sense in which humane understanding of others is non‐instrumentally valuable to its recipients. People have a complex but profound need to be humanely understood. Because we respond to others’ very real need when we pursue this sort of understanding of their emotions, empathy is best understood as itself a way of caring, rather than just a means to promote other caring behavior.

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DE SE PREFERENCES AND EMPATHY FOR FUTURE SELVES1

Cited by 17 publications

References 57 publications

First-Person Thought

First-Person Thought

Real World Problems

Empathy and the Value of Humane Understanding

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