China–Autos:Haven't We Danced this Dance Before?

Abstract

Just as it had in several recent similar disputes, the Panel in China–Autos found several of the challenged issues WTO-inconsistent. We believe virtually all of the deficiencies noted by the Panel could be easily addressed with minor changes to MOFCOM practices. The real significance of this dispute lies in what it tell us about the larger trade policy dance between the US and China. On the one hand, with the series of related WTO disputes the US has demonstrated that China must comply with WTO rules. The more vexing challenge, however, is the apparent tit-for-tat motivation for this and other recent Chinese trade policies, and on this point this dispute does little to change the calculus. The prospective nature of WTO relief makes it almost impossible for the WTO to discourage the type of opportunistic protectionist actions exemplified by this case.

China - HP-SSST: Last Part of Growing Pains?

“…It explicitly clarified that "[a]n examination of such developments and trends includes assessing whether import and domestic prices are moving in the same or contrary directions, and whether there has been a sudden and substantial increase in the domestic prices". 31 This argument mirrors the discussion in Mitchell and Prusa (2016) on how investigating authorities often use trend analysis to compare prices. In this specific case, if MOFCOM had done one, it would have detected a "non-obvious trend analysis" (in the words of Mitchell and Prusa, 2016) where prices of domestic and imported goods move in opposite directions (see Figure 2 in Mitchell and Prusa, 2016, with opposite labels as it is the domestic price to have increased in the case at hand).…”

“…31 This argument mirrors the discussion in Mitchell and Prusa (2016) on how investigating authorities often use trend analysis to compare prices. In this specific case, if MOFCOM had done one, it would have detected a "non-obvious trend analysis" (in the words of Mitchell and Prusa, 2016) where prices of domestic and imported goods move in opposite directions (see Figure 2 in Mitchell and Prusa, 2016, with opposite labels as it is the domestic price to have increased in the case at hand). A negative correlation per se would not be a sufficient condition to discard the possibility of undercutting but a more thorough analysis would be required, which would also have had to consider "the trivial volume of domestically produced Product C".…”

“…2 China -Anti-dumping Measures on Imports of Cellulose Pulp from Canada, Request for Consultations (DS483), WT/DS483/1. 3 Interested readers are referred to the prev ious articles that have discussed these final ru lings: see Vermulst (2014, 2015), Moore and Wu (2015), and Mitchell and Prusa (2016). stability, anti-steam oxidation and corrosion resistance at high temperature.…”

“…Time will tell. Vermu lst (2014, 2015), Moore and Wu (2015), and Mitchell and Prusa (2016). 14 Table 3 shows seven disputes in total but notice that the first one did not lead to the establishment of a Panel.…”

China and the WTO

“…The core cause of the limitation is that WTO's findings of violations often concern the application of domestic trade remedy legislation in individual investigations (i.e., an 'as applied' breach) rather than the legislation per se (i.e., an 'as such' breach). Piecemeal attacks tend to be ineffective at ensuring meaningful compliance or systemic changes in a Member's regulatory regime and practices (Mitchell and Prusa, 2016). Given the rampant (ab) use of trade remedies particularly AD worldwide, it is unlikely that China will retreat from its current practices.…”