2018
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01656
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“I” and “Me”: The Self in the Context of Consciousness

Abstract: James (1890) distinguished two understandings of the self, the self as “Me” and the self as “I”. This distinction has recently regained popularity in cognitive science, especially in the context of experimental studies on the underpinnings of the phenomenal self. The goal of this paper is to take a step back from cognitive science and attempt to precisely distinguish between “Me” and “I” in the context of consciousness. This distinction was originally based on the idea that the former (“Me”) corresponds to the… Show more

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Cited by 39 publications
(37 citation statements)
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References 75 publications
(99 reference statements)
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“…For example, an anorexic person may see her subjective body ("leib") as extremely fat, while her objective body ("körper") is actually skinny. A similar distinction was famously proposed by W. James (1890) between 'I' and 'me', whereby the latter may map onto the self-as-object, while the former the self-as-subject (see Wozniak 2018). Wittgenstein (1958) is yet another influential thinker who proposed a distinction between I-as-subject and I-as-object of an experience (see Longuenesse 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 70%
“…For example, an anorexic person may see her subjective body ("leib") as extremely fat, while her objective body ("körper") is actually skinny. A similar distinction was famously proposed by W. James (1890) between 'I' and 'me', whereby the latter may map onto the self-as-object, while the former the self-as-subject (see Wozniak 2018). Wittgenstein (1958) is yet another influential thinker who proposed a distinction between I-as-subject and I-as-object of an experience (see Longuenesse 2017).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 70%
“…Self has attribute I , which is known as subject or ontological self, and attribute me , which is known as object, phenomenal, or epistemological self (Dainton, 2016; King, 2009; Woźniak, 2018). Although I feels, desires, wills, and acts, me can acquire experience and engage in social relations (Mageo, 2003).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…That is, the causal agent, thinker or observer who does the thinking or observing, who is also responsible for self-awareness and self-knowledge. This distinction in self-referential awareness has re-emerged recently in neurocognitive science (Tagini & Raffone, 2010), particularly in the context of experimental studies investigating the phenomenological self and consciousness (Woźniak, 2018). This is notwithstanding the fact that, as noted by Rafaeli et al (2014), the monolithic conceptualization of the self has been rejected previously by various psychotherapeutic modalities (e.g.…”
Section: Authenticitymentioning
confidence: 96%