I Am Still Not Here Now

Predelli, Stefano

doi:10.1007/s10670-010-9224-4

Cited by 22 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Although, seeSidelle (1991),Predelli (1998a, b, 2002, 2011), Romdenh-Romluc (2002,Corazza et al (2002),Gorvett (2005), andCohen (2013).4 Stanley and Szabó explain that only a property (or other intensional restrictor) will give the correct modal profile for the proposition expressed.…”

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confidence: 99%

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Peet

2015

Philos Stud

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In the epistemology of testimony it is often assumed that audiences are able to reliably recover asserted contents. In the philosophy of language this claim is contentious. This paper outlines one problem concerning the recovery of asserted contents (the 'recovery problem'), and argues that it prevents audiences from gaining testimonial knowledge in a range of cases (even when the speaker is both sincere and a reliable belief former). The recovery problem, in essence, is simply that due to the collective epistemic limitations of the speaker and audience speakers will, in certain cases, be insensitive to the ways in which they may be misinterpreted. As a result audiences' beliefs will often fail the safety and sensitivity conditions on knowledge. Once the problem has been outlined and distinguished from several related problems in the philosophy of language and the epistemology of testimony, a series of responses are considered. The first response holds that audiences possess defeaters in recovery problem cases, and thus wouldn't form beliefs. The second response holds that the beliefs audiences form are very coarse grained, meaning they are not very vulnerable to failures of safety and sensitivity. The final response holds that the objects of speaker meaning are not propositional. All three responses are found to be unsatisfactory.

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confidence: 99%

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Peet

2015

Philos Stud

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“…Despite the above quote, I do not think that this is what Predelli intends, since he argues elsewhere that “semantics is concerned with the evaluation of sentences with respect to contexts, not with concrete episodes of language use” (, 301). However, given the earlier quote, someone could reasonably interpret him as saying otherwise.…”

Section: Sectionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Getting Expression‐Based Semantics Right: Its Proper Objects of Evaluation and Limits

Spewak¹

2016

The Southern J of Philosophy

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Often those attempting to resolve the answering machine paradox appeal to Kaplan's claim that the objects of semantic evaluation are expression‐types evaluated with respect to indices, instead of utterances, as part of their solution. This article argues that Dylan Dodd and Paula Sweeney exemplify the kind of mistakes theorists make in applying such expression‐based semantic theories in that (1) they conflate what is asserted with semantic content, and (2) they take their approach to utterance interpretation as having semantic significance. In light of these mistakes, we learn two things. First, we learn how expression‐based semantic theorists can avoid making these kinds of mistakes. Second, we learn how the limits of expression‐based semantics can contribute to what we should expect a semantic theory to explain regarding how semantics fits into a more general theory of linguistic communication and linguistic understanding.

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“…The "intentionalist view" (henceforth, the "I-view"), proposed by Predelli (1998;2002;2011), the "conventionalist view" (henceforth, the "C-view"), proposed by Corazza, Fish, and Gorvet (2002), the "context of tokening view" (henceforth, the "CT-view"), proposed by Cohen (2013), and the "shifty characters view" (henceforth, the "SC-view"), proposed by Michaelson (2014).…”

Section: Previous Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Interpretation of the Reference of “Now” in Written Messages: An Experimental View

Mizuta¹

2017

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The semantics of pure indexicals "I," "here," and "now" has been discussed in the area of philosophy of language.According to David Kaplan, in face-to-face communication, "I," "here," and "now" refer respectively to the agent, the place, and the time of the context of utterance. In recorded and written messages, however, the identification of pure indexical references is nontrivial, given that there is a gap between the time of utterance and that of interpretation. In the literature, four major views are proposed from a philosophical perspective. While these are theoretically competing, no empirical data or pragmatic analyses have been provided. How is the reference of "now" in written messages interpreted? Which views proposed in the literature are supported empirically? This paper investigates these questions from experimental and pragmatic perspectives.

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I Am Still Not Here Now

Cited by 22 publications

References 28 publications

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Testimony and the epistemic uncertainty of interpretation

Getting Expression‐Based Semantics Right: Its Proper Objects of Evaluation and Limits

The Interpretation of the Reference of “Now” in Written Messages: An Experimental View

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