Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity

Wrenn, Chase B.

doi:10.1111/j.2041-6962.2004.tb01000.x

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…In conflicts between moral normativity and epistemic normativity, the former often wins out (Wrenn 2004). In the case of paternalism, the epistemic imperfections of our rational agency do not, as some enthusiasts for paternalism would have it (Conly 2013, p. 40), mean that rational agency cannot be respected in general or when exercised inadequately.…”

Section: Trust Respect and Deferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Paternalism and our Rational Powers

Cholbi

2016

Mind

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According to rational will views of paternalism, the wrongmaking feature of paternalism is that paternalists disregard or fail to respect the rational will of the paternalized, in effect substituting their own presumably superior judgments about what ends the paternalized ought to pursue or how they ought to pursue them. Here I defend a version of the rational will view appealing to three rational powers that constitute rational agency, which I call recognition, discrimination, and satisfaction. By appealing to these powers, my version of the rational will view can rank the wrongfulness of paternalistic acts in terms of (a) the extent to which such acts amount to supplanting the paternalized individual's identity as a rational agent with that of the paternalist, and (b) the degree of mistrust in the paternalized individual's rational agency shown by the paternalistic act. My rational powers account thus provides a more complete account of why paternalism is a powerful, but not decisive or absolute, objection to an act or policy. My rational powers account also provides powerful explanations of why rational suasion deflects charges of paternalism; why consenting to intercessions in one's rational agency negates paternalism; why strong paternalism is generally more objectionable than weak paternalism; and why hard paternalism is generally more objectionable than soft paternalism.

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Section: Trust Respect and Deferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Paternalism and our Rational Powers

Cholbi

2016

Mind

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“…The distinction between DEN and CEN should not be confused with the distinction between hypothetical and categorical epistemic normativity (Wrenn, 2004). DEN and CEN are both conceptions (albeit different ones) of the right way to pursue our basic epistemic goal.…”

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“…I am also leaving it open whether the notion of epistemic value should be socialised, though this would surely be in the spirit of consequentialism: one should act not only with the purpose of maximising one's own share of veristic value, but of maximising veristic value quite generally. The distinction between DEN and CEN should not be confused with the distinction between hypothetical and categorical epistemic normativity (Wrenn, 2004). DEN and CEN are both conceptions (albeit different ones) of the right way to pursue our basic epistemic goal.…”

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Two Notions of Epistemic Normativity

Klausen

2009

Theoria

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The overwhelmingly dominant view of epistemic normativity has been an extreme form of deontology. I argue that although the pull towards deontology is quite understandable, given the traditional concerns of epistemology, there is no good reason for not also adopting a complementary consequentialist notion of epistemic normativity, which can be put to use in applied epistemology. I further argue that this consequentialist notion is not, despite appearances and popular sentiment to the contrary, any less genuinely epistemic than the deontological notion and that it may even be considered more genuinely normative.

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“…Given that not all theories or conceptions of normativity are even consistent with each other-e.g., those which understand that all normativity as absolute or categorical normativity versus those according to which all normativity is relative, instrumental, or hypothetical, etc. (Laudan 1984b: 34-40;Wrenn 2004)-it seems that some version of the normativity problem for naturalism will be perpetually available for the anti-naturalist wield as a bludgeon. Wrenn (2006: 67) A fortiori, another anti-naturalist might contend that the requisite kind of normativity necessary for the naturalist to motivate continuismN (which they in-principle cannot provide) is a certain conception of epistemic normativity required for the justification of continuismN.…”

Section: 2: Normativity and Naturalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

A metaphilosophy of naturalism

Childers¹

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Fales. I also thank my students for not only helping me sharpen my pedagogy but also for the many lessons that they have given me. Additionally, I am grateful to my colleagues and friends throughout my education, all of whom have been stimulating, worthy interlocutors and gadflies.Finally, for her resolute, steadfast devotion and support-emotional, intellectual, moral, and more-I am extraordinarily thankful to my partner, confidant, and best friend, Hanna G. Childers.

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Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity

Cited by 5 publications

References 5 publications

Paternalism and our Rational Powers

Paternalism and our Rational Powers

Two Notions of Epistemic Normativity

A metaphilosophy of naturalism

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