Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia

Abstract

The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of hypocrisy can be described either as cases of deception or as cases of akrasia. If this analysis correct, then I suggest further that the moral status of all instances of hypocrisy must be reduced either to the moral blameworthiness of deception or to the moral blameworthiness of akrasia. There can be no unified account of the moral wrongness of “hypocrisy” that holds across the disjunction.

Neural and Cognitive Signatures of Guilt Predict Hypocritical Blame

“…First, our findings do not directly speak to the precise neurocognitive mechanisms that give rise to moral judgments that conflict with past moral behaviors. While our data provide evidence that at least some instances of hypocritical blame cannot be explained by an absence of moral standards, we cannot definitively conclude that such cases are attributable to weakness of will (Bartel, 2019;Batson & Thompson, 2001;Mele, 1989), though our finding that hypocritical blame is positively associated with harmful errors does provide some preliminary evidence for this claim. Future studies might investigate this question with causal interventions designed to induce mental fatigue (Inzlicht et al, 2014;Schmidt et al, 2012).…”

“…This brain-based signature enabled us to draw conclusions about the underlying neurocognitive processes from patterns of activity in the whole brain, thereby avoiding inferring cognitive processes based solely on the location of brain activations (Poldrack, 2011;Wager et al, 2013). Some theorists have postulated that apparently hypocritical blamers are not really hypocritical if they experience guilty feelings for violating the moral standards, because hypocrites do not sincerely endorse the moral value in question but express it only for strategic reasons (Bartel, 2019;Bell, 2013;Wallace, 2010). Our multivariate analysis provided empirical evidence supporting this theoretical conjecture by showing that guilt-related processes evoked by consideration of harm to other people tracks individual differences in hypocritical blame.…”

Neural and cognitive signatures of guilt predict hypocritical blame

“…This brain-based signature enables us to draw conclusions about the underlying neurocognitive processes from patterns of activity in the whole brain, thereby avoiding inferring cognitive processes based solely on the location of brain activations (Poldrack, 2011;Wager et al, 2013). Some theorists have postulated that apparently hypocritical blamers are not really hypocritical if they experience guilty feelings for violating the moral standards, because hypocrites do not sincerely endorse the moral value in question but express it only for strategic reasons (Bartel, 2019;Bell, 2013;Wallace, 2010). Our multivariate analysis provided empirical evidence supporting this theoretical conjecture by showing that guilt-related processes evoked by consideration of harm to others tracks individual differences in hypocritical blame.…”

Toward a Brain-Based Bio-Marker of Guilt

“…Some philosophers, however, make the distinction between deceptive and akratic hypocrite. 17 Deceptive hypocrites "appears moral while, if possible, avoiding the cost of actually being moral." 18 These hypocrites do not genuinely care about the moral standards that they publicly preach or cite to blame others, and therefore deserve the moral objections that laypeople assign to hypocrites.…”

“…A hallmark of akratic hypocrites, therefore, is their feelings of conflict and guilt when they realize that what they do violates the moral standards they genuinely believe to be relevant and valuable. 17 Judging and treating deceptive and akratic hypocrites differently according to their mental states (ie, moral conflict, guilt) seems fairer and leaves room for moral education and self-improvement. 19 Behavioral measures alone are difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish these 2 types of hypocrites, because self-reported conflicted feelings and guilt can be easily faked.…”