Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame

Fritz, Kyle G.; Miller, Daniel J.

doi:10.1111/papq.12104

Cited by 85 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…Furthermore, even if we accept that pretending to care in order to deceive is a genuine case of hypocritical blame, it still does not cover all cases of hypocritical blame. Attempting to deceive is not necessary 7 On this point, see also Fritz and Miller 2015. HYPOCRITICAL BLAME, FAIRNESS, AND STANDING 143 for hypocrisy. In order to be a hypocrite, Harvey does not need to intend to deceive Laura.…”

Section: What Is Hypocritical Blame and Why Is It Wrong?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This claim will play an important role in how I explain why hypocritical blame undermines ones standing to express blame. Fritz and Miller (2015) and Wallace (2010) argue that what is wrong with hypocritical blame is the fact that the hypocrites treat or regard peoples interests as less important than their own, and this is why they tend to blame others for mistakes they themselves are guilty of without blaming themselves first. The fact that hypocrites make exceptions of themselves undermines the equal standing of people.…”

Section: What Is Hypocritical Blame and Why Is It Wrong?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing

Roadevin

2018

Metaphilosophy

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This paper argues that hypocritical blame renders blame inappropriate. Someone should not express her blame if she is guilty of the same thing for which she is blaming others, in the absence of an admission of fault. In failing to blame herself for the same violations of norms she condemns in another, the hypocrite evinces important moral faults, which undermine her right to blame. The hypocrite refuses or culpably fails to admit her own mistakes, while at the same time demands that others admit theirs. The paper argues that this lack of reciprocity-expecting others to take morality seriously by apologizing for their faults, without one doing the same in return-is what makes hypocritical blame unfair.

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Section: What Is Hypocritical Blame and Why Is It Wrong?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: What Is Hypocritical Blame and Why Is It Wrong?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing

Roadevin

2018

Metaphilosophy

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“…The ethics of blame emerges as a significant area of inquiry once one recognizes that a person being morally responsible or blameworthy does not settle the question of whether one ought to blame that person-there are certain conditions one must meet. 18 The ethics of blame is still a nascent area of inquiry with many unsettled questions, including, for example, why, if at all, hypocritical blaming is inappropriate (Cohen 2006;Fritz and Miller 2018; Todd 2017; Wallace 2010), how "moral standing" is a sensible notion if morality is universal (Smilansky 2006), and so on. Despite the lively ongoing debate, one aspect of the debate remains uncontroversial: it is wrong to blame a person who does not deserve blame or blame a person beyond what he or she deserves.…”

Section: The Dependence Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Firm Responses to Mass Outrage: Technology, Blame, and Employment

Bhargava

2018

J Bus Ethics

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When an employee's off-duty conduct generates mass social media outrage, managers commonly respond by firing the employee. This, I argue, can be a mistake. The thesis I defend is the following: the fact that a firing would occur in a mass social media outrage context brought about by the employee's off-duty conduct generates a strong ethical reason weighing against the act. In particular, it contributes to the firing constituting an inappropriate act of blame. Scholars who caution against firing an employee for off-duty conduct have thus far focused primarily on due process related issues or legal concerns pertaining to free speech, lifestyle discrimination, and employment at-will. However, these concerns amount to only a partial, and contingent, diagnosis of what is at issue. I argue that even when due process considerations are met, firings in these contexts can be unjustified. Moreover, even if a business is not concerned with the unethical conduct per se, but is rather strictly concerned with PR, the argument I advance nevertheless provides one important ethical reason that counts against firings in mass social media outrage contexts. Given that managers are often under significant pressure to respond swiftly in cases where an employee is at the center of mass social media outrage, it is especially important that scholars begin to clarify the normative issues. This article builds on the burgeoning philosophical literature on the ethics of blame and provides a novel account of a distinctive ethical concern that arises with firings in mass social media outrage contexts.

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“…See especially Radzik and , Smith : 478, and Bell : 269 ‐ 271. Fritz and Miller (: 2) set aside the “business condition”, but note that they see it as a condition on “moral standing” of the same sort as the “non‐hypocrisy” condition. Coates and Tognazzini () consider it under such a heading as well.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This objection also applies to Fritz and Miller's (: 5) favoured account of hypocrisy, on which one is hypocritical only if one has actually violated the relevant norm.…”

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confidence: 99%

A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame

Todd

2017

Nous

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Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: 1. One's blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent's wrongdoing. 3. One is warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the wrongdoing. 4. The target's wrongdoing is some of “one's business”. These conditions are often proposed as both conditions on one and the same thing, and as marking fundamentally different ways of “losing standing”. Here I call these claims into question. First, I claim that conditions (3) and (4) are simply conditions on different things than are conditions (1) and (2). Second, I argue that condition (2) reduces to condition (1): when “involvement” removes someone's standing to blame, it does so only by indicating something further about that agent, viz., that he or she lacks commitment to the values that condemn the wrongdoer's action. The result: after we clarify the nature of the non‐hypocrisy condition, we will have a unified account of moral standing to blame. Issues also discussed: whether standing can ever be regained, the relationship between standing and our “moral fragility”, the difference between mere inconsistency and hypocrisy, and whether a condition of standing might be derived from deeper facts about the “equality of persons”.

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Hypocrisy and the Standing to Blame

Cited by 85 publications

References 13 publications

Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing

Hypocritical Blame, Fairness, and Standing

Firm Responses to Mass Outrage: Technology, Blame, and Employment

A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame

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