Hylomorphic Animalism, Emergentism, and the Challenge of the New Mechanist Philosophy of Neuroscience

Abstract

Abstract. This article, the first of a two-part essay, presents an account of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism that engages with recent work on neuroscience and philosophy of mind. I show that Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is compatible with the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology, but that it is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. I begin with the basic claims of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism and focus on its understanding of psychological powers embodied in the nervous system. Next, I introduce the new mechanist approach to neuroscience and psychology and illustrate how it can enrich the more abstract ontological framework of Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism. In the third section of this article I establish in detail the many ways Aristotelian hylomorphic animalism is incompatible with strong emergentism in the philosophy of mind. Based on these fundamental differences I show why a criticism leveled against emergentism by the new mechanist philosophy does not hamper my proposed rapprochement between hylomorphism and the new mechanist philosophy. This conclusion, however, leaves untouched the problem I address in the second article, namely, is the new mechanist philosophy compatible with Aristotelian philosophical anthropology's contention that intellectual operations are immaterial and interact with the psychosomatic operations of the rational animal?Keywords: Hylomorphism; Animalism; New Mechanist Philosophy; Neuroscience; Psychology; Philosophical Anthropology; Aristotelianism; Thomas Aquinas; Emergentism.Hylomorphic Animalism, Emergentism... This essay contributes to these Thomist efforts to resolve certain apparent tensions in THP that concern the interaction of the human person's immaterial intellectual or noetic operations with the psychosomatic sensory One potential barrier is related to the rejection of strong emergentism (SE) by proponents of NMP. In the third section ( §III) of this paper, I address why hylomorphic animalism is not a form of strong emergentism. I then draw attention to the similar reasons given by both HMA and NMP for rejecting SE and the Crypto-Cartesian framework that generates it. But this conclusion introduces a new difficulty, for HMA's and NMP's objections to strong emergence seem to apply no less to THP, which maintains that the intellectual powers of any person are immaterial. I take this challenge seriously. In the second article, I address this challenge and other difficulties with the Thomist account of the interaction of noetic and psychosomatic operations. Aristotelian Hylomorphic AnimalismNeo-Aristotelian hylomorphism is the view that all natural substances, cortex, and so forth) in one way that is distinct from the way it animates the bodily organs of the ear, cochlea, auditory cortex, and so forth, which constitute the power of audition. In short, HMA holds that an animal is constituted as a substance by virtue of the soul's abiding organizational animation that pervades the entire organic body. But, the vege...

Science-Engaged Thomism

“…One of the contributors to this volume is Daniel De Haan, who in his work (De Haan 2017 discusses, critically reflects on, and incorporates insights from both neuroscience and psychology for an Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophical anthropology, especially psychology. Another example would be Robert Koons (2018aKoons ( , 2018bKoons ( , 2019Koons ( , 2020, who has been working, together with William Simpson (Simpson 2021(Simpson , 2023Simpson and Pemberton 2022), towards a hylomorphic interpretation of quantum theory, and recently presented a defence of Aquinas' Aristotelian philosophy of nature (Koons 2022).…”

Hylomorphism Extended: Dynamical Forms and Minds

“…Mental properties are simply attributes of the whole organization of form-matter complex. They are implemented by lower level mechanisms, but it is the whole animal that has sensory powers, perception, memory, emotions and volition, grounded in its ecosystem [7]. Physical, chemical, molecular properties evolved to maintain "efficient animation", leading to organization of the organism that helped it to survive.…”

“…Relation of the hylomorphic view to strong emergence have recently been discussed by de Haan [7]. He has used distinction between mechanistic organization and psychological organization.…”

“…This idea, called hylomorphism, became the foundation of Thomist philosophy in the 13th century [3]. Hylomorphism has been quite influential philosophical theory since antiquity, and is still frequently discussed in contemporary analytical philosophy and theology [4,5], including mechanistic philosophy of biology and neuroscience [6,7]. In preface to the book "Neo-Aristotelian Perspectives on Contemporary Science" John Haldane writes about "shared sense that Aristotelian ideas have much to offer", and the introduction, written by the editors of this book, starts with a claim "A recent revival in (neo-)Aristotelian philosophy is beginning to transform the landscape of contemporary analytic philosophy" [8].…”

“…The substantial form of a material body, called in Thomist philosophy "soul", was understood as the animating essence of plants, animals and rational humans. De Haan [7] calls this approach "hylomorphic animalism" (HMA): Animals are complex unified psychosomatic substances endowed with integrated biological and psychological attributes. Explanation how this animated principle relates to sensory and intellectual powers was of course well beyond the capability of ancient and medieval philosophers.…”