Hybrid Warfare as a Metod of Implementing the National Strategy – The Case of Crimea

Abstract

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, carried out with an amazing speed and coordination of various soft and hard instruments of national power, while simultaneously using the power of protests by the local pro-Russian population, is undoubtedly one of the better examples of hybrid warfare. The brutality and simultaneous surgical precision of the operation have made it feel as if each of the instruments of national power had played its precisely defined role, which had its basis in the national security and defence documents, such as the national security strategy and military doctrine. This is a proof of the adaptation of the Russia’s military and political strategic framework to the new global challenges of the modern world. The formerly rigid Russia using the primarily brutal military power typical of the Soviet regime, has in this case proved to be a dynamic and highly flexible force, capable of using various instruments of national power, coupled with an appropriate support of a considerably altered, but extremely effective military power instrument. In doing so, it actually shocked the Western professional and political public and opened a wide debate in professional circles, which had previously not attributed the ability of such activities to Russia. Hybrid warfare has become a constant feature of discussions in the military and political circles of the West, focusing primarily on finding solutions to effectively counter the new threat presented in Crimea by the Russian side. Key words Hybrid warfare, national strategy, military doctrine, Crimea.

Eu-Nato Cooperation and the Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union

“…Whether it is a covert operation below the threshold of armed conflict, or a direct threat requiring a military response, synergies between the two organizations allow Member States to act in virtually all domains. A major step in the EU-NATO cooperation framework would be to change the current way of solving controversial situations by finding the lowest common denominator 26 . Moving away from this "unanimity" decision-making model would mean that the interests of a single state can no longer prevail over the common objectives of the EU or of NATO.…”