Hybrid Speech Acts: A Theory of Normative Thought and Language That ‘Has It Both Ways’

Abstract

In this essay, I propose a novel hybrid metanormative theory. According to this theory, speakers making normative claims express both cognitive and motivational attitudes in virtue of the constitutive norms of the particular speech acts they perform. This view has four principal virtues: (1) it is consistent with traditional semantic theories, (2) it supports a form of motivational judgment internalism that does justice to externalist intuitions, (3) it illuminates the connection between normative language and normative thought, and (4) it explains how speakers can express different conative states when speaking in different normative domains. In the first section, I discuss the theories of Stephen Finlay and David Copp. I show that they each come very close to having it both ways but ultimately fail. Understanding the shortcomings of these views is instrumental to a clear presentation of my own Hybrid Speech Act theory in section two. In the final section, I demonstrate how my view achieves its four advantages.

Plato's Revenge: Moral Deliberation As Dialogical Activity

“…Though it does not assume the truth of, it is consistent with: a broadly descriptivist semantics of normative terms, a theory of normative beliefs as ordinary beliefs, and a Humean theory of psychology. Like Finlay and Copp, I admit that this story is as yet incomplete (Morgan, , pp. 13–14).…”

“…Though each of these domains differs somewhat in its felicity conditions – because each has its own practices and goals – what the normative speech act types have in common is their inclusion of both cognitive norms and practical (or affective) norms. For more on my own analysis of normative speech acts see Morgan, and Morgan, .…”