Hybrid expressivism and epistemic justification

Grajner, Martin

doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0415-8

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Let me now consider some potential objections: Objection 1: I like to measure accuracy using a strictly proper scoring rule: one according to which every probability function maximizes expected accuracy relative to itself. So whatever my credence is in H, I'll prefer, when the goal is accuracy, the 5 This characterization is inspired by (but different from) accounts in a number of papers, notably: Gibbard (1986), Chrisman (2007), Ridge (2006Ridge ( , 2007 and Grajner (2015). adoption of that credence to any other.…”

Section: The Permissiveness Of Rotionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis

Schoenfield

2018

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In recent years, permissivism—the claim that a body of evidence can rationalize more than one response—has enjoyed somewhat of a revival. But it is once again being threatened, this time by a host of new and interesting arguments that, at their core, are challenging the permissivist to explain why rationality matters. A version of the challenge that I am especially interested in is this: if permissivism is true, why should we expect the rational credences to be more accurate than the irrational ones? My aim is to turn this challenge on its head and argue that, actually, those who deny permissivism will have a harder time responding to such a challenge than those who accept it.

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Section: The Permissiveness Of Rotionalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“… This characterization is inspired by (but different from) accounts in a number of papers, notably: Gibbard (), Chrisman (), Ridge (, ) and Grajner (). …”

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confidence: 99%