Husserl on rationality

Abstract

Edmund Husserl devoted considerable effort to the development of a phenomenological theory of rationality, as, for instance, part four of Ideas 1 attests. After providing some necessary background, I will spell out the details of Husserl's account. Yet, as I will also argue, Husserl's official doctrine is untenable due to several ambiguities and internal tensions. Hence, my primary aim in this paper is to offer a modified phenomenological theory of rationality that avoids the problems of Husserl's original account.

Are there irrational perceptual experiences?

“…This sweeping and complex statement privileges the fullness of intuitions in relation to the mediacy of inferential justification, rendering it fundamental to the edifice of knowledge. As such, it stands in need of considerable clarification and, arguably, qualification, both of which have recently been provided by Harald Wiltsche (Wiltsche 2022).…”