Hume’s Ontology

Johansson, Ingvar

doi:10.1007/s12133-012-0095-9

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Therefore, content and object are regarded as always being distinct for the same reason that I regard from-pole and to-pole as necessarily being distinct. Hume is a classic example, all intentionality takes in his explicit ontology departure from what he calls ideas, and such ideas are simply nonintentionally given (Johansson 2012).…”

Section: Disjunctivism and The From-polesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Triple Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and Anti-representationalism

Johansson

2014

Metaphysica

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Contemporary defenders of non-disjunctivism take a representationalist philosophy of mind for granted; all kinds of conscious intentional states/acts/ events are automatically regarded as being representations. The paper presents an alternative anti-representationalist view of the mind. It differs from other present-day anti-representationalisms in arguing that all conscious phenomena contains a this-worldly something called "from-pole", and it denies that an intentional content and the corresponding intentional object always are distinct entities. The view is set in contrast to both a transcendental ego tradition and a no from-pole tradition. Hereby, the paper defends the common sense-like view that we are persons who directly perceive, act in, and talk about things in a common world.

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Section: Disjunctivism and The From-polesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Triple Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and Anti-representationalism

Johansson

2014

Metaphysica

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Collections as One-and-Many—On the Nature of Numbers

Johansson¹

2015

Grazer Philos Stud

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Peter Simons has been rather alone in the modern philosophy of mathematics to argue that the natural numbers should be regarded as properties of multitudes or collections. This paper, however, sides with Simons, but it modifies his property view by adding the notion of imposed collection boundaries and accepting fictional collections. Although partly inspired by the Husserl of Philosophy of Arithmetic, Simons dismisses Husserl's talk of psychological acts of collective combination, but this paper saves them by dressing them in modern cognitive clothes. Hereby, a reasonable partially constructivist notion of the natural numbers emerges. ***** The most naive opinion is that according to which a number is something like a heap, a swarm in which the things are contained lock, stock and barrel. Next comes the conception of number as a property of a heap, aggregate, or whatever else one might call it. Frege, Review of Dr. E. Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic (Frege 1972 [1894], 323) 1 This view is also argued for by (Yi 1998). He presents it by criticizing the relational account in (Bigelow 1988). He is aware of Simons as a forerunner, but in a long footnote (25) he complains about ambiguities in (Simons 1982a). I find him over-complaining. About Yi, see also footnote 12 below. 2 My trope accepting realism is best defended in (Johansson 2014a) and my view of fictions in (Johansson 2010). 3 Of course, noted by Simons: "The history of the philosophy of mathematics during the golden years of 1879-1939 hardly ever mentions Husserl" (Simons 2010, v).

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Hume’s Ontology

Cited by 2 publications

References 13 publications

Triple Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and Anti-representationalism

Triple Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and Anti-representationalism

Collections as One-and-Many—On the Nature of Numbers

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