Spectres of False Divinity 2010
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579945.003.0001
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Hume's Moral Atheism

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Cited by 2 publications
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“…We do not claim either argument is explicitly offered in any particular text. Nonetheless, the two arguments have a distinctly Humean flavour; previous authors have identified similar themes (Siebert (1984); Holden (2010); De Cruz (2015) ). Some of Hume's discussion of religion (e.g.…”
Section: The Argument From Idolatrymentioning
confidence: 85%
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“…We do not claim either argument is explicitly offered in any particular text. Nonetheless, the two arguments have a distinctly Humean flavour; previous authors have identified similar themes (Siebert (1984); Holden (2010); De Cruz (2015) ). Some of Hume's discussion of religion (e.g.…”
Section: The Argument From Idolatrymentioning
confidence: 85%
“…Hume scholars agree with our interpretation. For example, Thomas Holden cites passages to support the claim that human passions are not directed towards God (Holden (2010), 51). According to Holden, Hume believed that ‘God is not merely currently unseen and unknown [on Hume's view] but “Invisib[le] and Incomprehensib[le]” ’, unrepresentable by human faculties ( ibid ., 66).…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The underlying consideration here concerns the kind of conclusions that Hume's mitigated scepticism allows him to endorse. For instance, Holden (2010) thinks that even in natural theology, his mitigated scepticism allows us to endorse some limited conclusions about God.…”
Section: Epistemic Virtues and Inquiry Normsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Next, notice that after enumerating the evils (inferential argument from evil), he continues by presenting the evidential argument from evil. The evidential argument, as Holden (2010) notes is clearly an argument that Philo cannot endorseit clearly contradicts his own epistemological position (Holden 2010: 173-6). Instead, unlike his presentation of the logical argument from evil (in D 10), Philo's presentation of the evidential argument may be viewed as a clear act of rhetorical persuasion, using strong and colourful language:…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%