Hume's emotivist theory of moral judgements

Abstract

Hume is believed by many to hold an emotivist thesis, according to which all expressions of moral judgements are expressions of moral sentiments. However, most specialist scholars of Hume either deny that this is Hume's position or believe that he has failed to argue convincingly for it. I argue that Hume is an emotivist and that his true arguments for emotivism have been hitherto overlooked. Readers seeking to understand Hume's theory of moral judgements have traditionally looked to the first section of Book 3 of his Treatise, which discusses the relation between morality and reason. I argue that there is evidence elsewhere that better supports Hume's emotivist thesis. Hume's arguments for emotivism focus more on the causes of moral sentiments than on their relation to reason or belief, and he argues that moral sentiments are such as to arise whenever we contemplate morally relevant objects. He also holds that the presence of moral sentiments precludes any possibility of moral belief, because moral beliefs could only be less vivid copies of moral sentiments, and these cannot simultaneously exist. Hume concludes that all moral judgements must be expressions of sentiments.

Enhancing Emotional Intelligence With the Positive Humanities: A Narrative Review and Proposal for Well-Being Interventions

“…A school of thought on moral philosophy that can guide the use of emotions for moral decision-making is emotivism. This branch of moral philosophy is attributed to David Hume, who argued that emotions (“moral sentiments”) arise when individuals contemplate morally relevant objects (Chamberlain, 2020). Individuals then approve or disapprove of a subject or topic based on these sentiments and feelings.…”

Hume's sentimentalism: Not non-cognitivism

“…As a consequence, not all ways in which Hume might be read as a non-cognitivist about ethics are properly canvassed, and correlatively, the reasons why Hume is not to be read as a non-cognitivist remain unclear. Secondly, non-cognitivist interpretations have recently received renewed support (Joyce 2009;Smith 2009;Sobel 2009;Shecaira 2011;Chamberlain 2019). 1 I shall argue that making the appropriate metaethical distinctions undermines this renewed support and shows that non-cognitivist interpretations remain unpersuasive.…”

“…James Chamberlain has recently argued that Hume holds an 'emotivist' theory of moral judgement (Chamberlain 2019). Like many others, however, Chamberlain fails to distinguish semantic from psychological accounts.…”