Hume, Empiricism and the Generality of Thought

Abstract

Hume sought to analyse our propositionally-structured thought in terms of

Causal Realism and the Limits of Empiricism: Some Unexpected Insights from Hegel

“…Elsewhere I have argued in detail that both Kant and Hegel developed sound criticisms of empiricist epistemology that undermine such reservations (Westphal 1989, chap. 4;1998a, 2002-3, 2003c, 2004, 2007, 2013a, 2013c, 2014; empiricist reservations about explanation and causal powers are discussed in Westphal (2006Westphal ( , 2014Westphal ( , 2016). ton's Principia.…”

Hegel’s Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant’s System of Principles in theLogicandEncyclopaedia

“…81 On the scope and (severe) limits of concept empiricism, see Turnbull ( 1959 ) and Westphal ( 2013c ). 82 For further detailed discussion, see Westphal (2010-11). sound, whilst hardly mentioning a key term in these issues: idealism, other than to indicate Hegel's rejection of Kant's Transcendental Idealism.…”

How Kant Justifies Freedom of Agency (without Transcendental Idealism)

“…Instead, his transcendental proof of realism entails that there is, and each apperceptive human being succeeds in recognising, sufficient causal interaction amongst substances in his or her surroundings to be able to plot a personal history through space and time, to whatever extent he or she succeeds in so doing. This extent cannot be determined a priori (Westphal 2004;cf. Harper 2007).…”

“…The a priori status of these conceptions follows from the fact that any empirical concept must be learned, acquired or defined on the basis of our experience of relevant spatio‐temporal particulars, the identification of which requires possession and competent use of these conceptions. (For detailed examination, see Westphal .) To speak of particulars ‘causing’ our conceptions (or beliefs) cannot be given any legitimate (justifiable) constitutive interpretation (see Westphal : §63.1) and obscures rather than illuminates the central issues, in part because causal de scription—widely popular amongst causal theorists of mind, of reference and of action—does not suffice for causal a scription, much less for justifiable causal ascription.…”

“…Although the present analysis contradicts several centuries of empiricism, I respectfully submit that Kant understood the implications of Hume's Treatise better than Hume's empiricist successors. For example, at its core, Quine's semantics is incoherent, for reasons revealed by his superficial mis‐reading of Hume, ‘Of Scepticism with regard to the senses’ ( Treatise 1.4.2); see Westphal (, ). Kant's epistemology itself, of course, is not an object of empirical knowledge.…”