2008
DOI: 10.1177/0022002708316742
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Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict

Abstract: The authors examine the effects that famine relief efforts (food aid) can have in regions undergoing civil war. In the model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid entering the region. How much they can loot affects their choice of army size; therefore the manner in which aid is delivered influences warfare. The authors identify a delivery plan for aid that minimizes total recruitment in equilibrium.

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Cited by 24 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 31 publications
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“…The warlords may optimize their recruitment and violence strategies to ensure that populations in their regions are poor and needy enough to persuade food agencies to allocate their resources there. At the same time, the warlords may limit the size of their armies and the information about them, as greater relief efforts may be available for regions with fewer insurgents (Blouin & Pallage 2008).…”
Section: Aid Conflict and Policy Interventionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The warlords may optimize their recruitment and violence strategies to ensure that populations in their regions are poor and needy enough to persuade food agencies to allocate their resources there. At the same time, the warlords may limit the size of their armies and the information about them, as greater relief efforts may be available for regions with fewer insurgents (Blouin & Pallage 2008).…”
Section: Aid Conflict and Policy Interventionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although the Samaritan's dilemma, in the context of humanitarian aid, is significantly more difficult to solve than in typical aid relationships, the authors propose a self-enforcing contract that does address the problem. In a different paper, Blouin and Pallage (2008) show that humanitarian aid agencies are not deprived of means to influence conflicts on the ground: they can use warlords' greed to influence warfare by designing conditional aid delivery schedules. In the present paper, we put the spotlight on the micro-foundations of an equilibrium involving two belligerants, their respective population and an aid agency.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Empirical evidence also supports the claim of potential spoils of war as incentive for conflict (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004), though existing contextual factors such as severe social inequality and low per capita income (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004;Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000) may play a greater role in determining the outbreak of conflict. The food aid 'curse' disincentivizes kleptocratic rulers from action if humanitarian aid is forthcoming (Blouin and Pallage 2007). Humanitarian agencies face a 'Samaritan's dilemma', in which the supply of food aid in turn perversely creates a demand for assistance.…”
Section: Emergency Food Aidmentioning
confidence: 99%