Humanitarian engagement under counter-terrorism: a conflict of norms and the emerging policy landscape

Abstract

This article identifies two countervailing sets of norms – one promoting humanitarian engagement with non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in armed conflict in order to protect populations in need, and the other prohibiting such engagement with listed ‘terrorist’ groups in order to protect security – and discusses how this conflict of norms might affect the capacity of humanitarian organizations to deliver life-saving assistance in areas under the control of one of these groups. Rooted in international humanitarian law (IHL), the first set of norms provides a basis for humanitarian engagement with NSAGs in non-international armed conflict for the purpose of assisting populations under their control and promoting compliance with the rules of IHL. The second set of rules attempts to curtail financial and other forms of material support, including technical training and co-ordination, to listed ‘terrorist’ organizations, some of which may qualify as NSAGs under IHL. The article highlights counter-terrorism regulations developed by the United States and the United Nations Security Council, though other states and multilateral bodies have similar regulations. The article concludes by sketching ways in which humanitarian organizations might respond to the identified tensions.

Negotiating humanitarian space with criminal armed groups in urban Latin America

“…'Negotiation' introduces a transactional element that could more easily lead to the erosion of humanitarian principles. 2 Most of the available literature on humanitarian negotiations in armed conflict covers agencies' engagement with the state (Lacharite, 2011), with NSAGs (Jackson, 2014a;Clements, 2019), or with groups subject to counter-terrorism legislation (Modirzadeh, Lewis, and Bruderlein, 2011). While a report by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative focuses on the role of IHL and other legal frameworks in humanitarian negotiations (Grace and Wilkinson, 2016), studies by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Mancini-Griffoli and Picot, 2004) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Mc Hugh and Bessler, 2006) highlight the role of humanitarian principles and values during negotiations.…”

“…A paper by Lucchi (2010) argued that international agencies need to respond to the humanitarian needs of vulnerable communities regardless of whether the violence affecting them stems from an international war, an internal conflict, or another situation of violence. This contributed to shifting the debate on engagement with non‐state armed groups (NSAGs) beyond politically motivated insurgents (Dudouet, 2010; Whitfield, 2010) and violent extremist groups (Modirzadeh, Lewis, and Bruderlein, 2011; Briscoe, 2013) towards criminal armed groups (CAGs) with more parochial objectives, such as gangs in Guatemala City (Guatemala), Port‐au‐Prince (Haiti), and Rio de Janeiro (Brazil). Two years later, Lucchi (2012) changed the focus from ‘why’ humanitarian agencies should intervene in the settings of urban violence regardless of the labels attached to contexts and perpetrators, to ‘how’ they can intervene effectively from an operational point of view to address attendant needs.…”

Fighting with words: humanitarian security and the changing role of law in contemporary armed conflict

“…In other instances, international counter‐terrorism laws have also been reported to increase the risk of physical violence against humanitarians. As Marín and Ali (2021, p. 4) explain, some non‐state armed groups may be ‘unwilling to accept the presence of a foreign organization or foreign workers that originate from the same countries that have criminalized membership of their group and designated them as “terrorists”‘ (see also Modirzadeh, Lewis, and Bruderlein, 2011). There are also various other, non‐terrorism‐related instances where the criminalisation of aid delivery has been used to limit access to aid by certain groups, with negative consequences for both aid providers and humanitarian beneficiaries.…”

When do rebels sign agreements with the United Nations? An investigation into the politics of international humanitarian engagement

“…7 Within the confines of their sovereign territory, governments have diverse options to respond to internal rebellion, including accommodation, co-optation, to repression (Asal et al, 2019; Heger and Salehyan, 2007; Staniland, 2017). In the context of humanitarian engagement between rebels and international actors, some national governments block the international access upfront, often utilizing counterterrorism laws that restrict the movement of international actors engaging nonstate armed groups in national sovereign territories (Modirzadeh et al, 2011). The tools gatekeeper governments employ range from outright rejection of international access 8 to the subtle measures that require many bureaucratic obstacles for civil society to operate (Dupuy et al, 2016).…”