Humanitarian Assistance and the Duration of Peace after Civil War

Abstract

The principles of humanitarian assistance dictate that aid be distributed in accordance with need while remaining neutral with respect to the political stakes. However, these principles have unique implications in the postconflict context, where need is often correlated with opponents' performance in the previous contest. In these cases, humanitarian assistance is likely to be biased towards the conflict loser. Using a crisis-bargaining framework, this article describes a simple logic for how humanitarian aid can inadvertently undermine peace by creating a revisionist party with the incentive to renegotiate the postwar settlement. The empirical expectations of the theory are tested using a panel dataset of cross-national humanitarian aid expenditures in civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War. As the theory predicts, postconflict states treated with higher levels of humanitarian assistance exhibit shorter spells of peace; however, this effect only occurs after conflicts that ended with a decisive victory.

Assisting Uncertainty: How Humanitarian Aid can Inadvertently Prolong Civil War

“…Following previous work (Narang ), I estimate the amount of humanitarian aid disbursed in each conflict‐year using the OECD data on Official Development Assistance (ODA) . To be classified as humanitarian, aid must be designed to save lives and alleviate suffering during and in the aftermath of emergencies, while it must also be consistent with the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence.…”

The Hearts and Minds in Conflict and Peace

“…My analysis suggests that the violence-inducing effect of aid can be explained by the capacity explanation, which states that aid may em-power rebels and fuel further violence (e.g. Narang, 2014). This finding also provides a refinement to the theory.…”

“…Its effectiveness, however, has been a subject of debate among scholars and policy makers alike. While some empirical studies have shown that aid is effective in deterring or ending violent conflicts (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014;Collier and Hoeffler, 2002a;de Ree and Nillesen, 2009;Savun and Tirone, 2012), some have found it ineffective or, in some cases, counterproductive (Crost, Felter, and Johnston, 2014;Dube and Naidu, 2015;Narang, 2014;Narang, 2015;Nunn and Qian, 2014;Sollenberg, 2012;Wood and Sullivan, 2015).…”

“…Dube and Naidu (2015) add that foreign military assistance can also strengthen armed non-state actors, undermining political institution in Colombia. Finally, Narang (2014) and Narang (2015) theorize that because humanitarian assistance can improve the bargaining position of the aid recipients, it may exacerbate the commitment problem and increases the chances of war recurrence.…”

“…Presenting a slightly different argument using the bargaining framework, Narang (2014) considers that aid may encourage a group to renegotiate. But they both predict that aid can strengthen the position of an armed group, enabling it to fight against the authority.…”