Human Rights: Minimum and Maximum Perspectives

Brems, Eva

doi:10.1093/hrlr/ngp016

Cited by 23 publications

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“…If it chooses to "abstain" from intervening in the political struggle underlying certain human rights claims by not finding a violation of the ECHR, then this does not imply, as Article 53 ECHR would have it on formal legal terms, that "the situation after a 'no violation' finding [is] the same as without an intervention" by the ECtHR. 1680 Rather, as Eva Brems has put it, "the public and political perception of such an ECtHR judgment in practice is that of a Court clearance of a restrictive practice as such" 1681 -in other words, where a finding of a violation challenges the status quo, a finding of no vi-olation reinforces it. 1682 In fact, the ECtHR itself has implicitly acknowledged as much by claiming that an evolutive approach to its case-law is necessary so as not to become "a bar to reform or improvement".…”

Section: Interim Reflections: Rethinking the Role Of The Courtmentioning

confidence: 99%

European Consensus between Strategy and Principle

Theilen¹

2021

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This study offers a critical account of the reasoning employed by the European Court of Human Rights, particularly its references to European consensus. Based on an in-depth analysis of the Court’s case-law against the backdrop of human rights theory, it will be of interest to both practitioners and theorists. While European consensus is often understood as providing an objective benchmark within the Court’s reasoning, this study argues to the contrary that it forms part of the very structures of argument that render human rights law indeterminate. It suggests that foregrounding consensus and the Court’s legitimacy serves to entrench the status quo and puts forward novel ways of approaching human rights to enable social transformation.

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Section: Interim Reflections: Rethinking the Role Of The Courtmentioning

confidence: 99%

European Consensus between Strategy and Principle

Theilen¹

2021

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“…Likewise, how far the implementation of a given human right should go, irrespective of internal differentiation between different kinds of rights, is also a live issue. From a doctrinal point of view, debates about the proper content to be attributed to human rights often take the form of a choice between 'minimalism' versus 'maximalism' in international human rights protection (Brems 2009).…”

Section: Looking To Practice: the European Court Of Human Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Rights, Legitimacy, Political Judgement

Hall

Tsarapatsanis

2020

Res Publica

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This paper grapples with Bernard Williams's prima vista enigmatic assertion that '[w]hether it is a matter of good philosophical sense to treat a practice as a violation of human rights, and whether it is politically good sense, cannot ultimately constitute two separate questions'. Though Williams's approach to thinking about human rights has a number of affinities with other 'political' and 'minimalist' understandings, we highlight its distinctive features and argue that it has significant implications for our understanding of human rights along a number of key dimensions. We then proceed to explain how Williams's way of thinking about human rights coheres with certain aspects of the reasoning of one of the most important international human rights courts, to wit, the European Court of Human Rights. This lends further plausibility to the view that a politically realistic understanding of human rights, of the kind urged by Williams, should be taken seriously, since it is a plausible candidate for the explanation of important aspects of human rights practices. We close by examining the suggestion that thinking in these terms is worryingly conservative. Keywords Bernard Williams • Human rights • European Convention of Human Rights • Legitimacy • Political realism • Political judgement In his essay 'Human Rights and Relativism', Bernard Williams declares that 'Whether it is a matter of good philosophical sense to treat a practice as a violation of human rights, and whether it is politically good sense, cannot ultimately constitute two separate questions' (Williams 2005, p. 72). At first blush, this remark appears enigmatic and infuriating. Why cannot we distinguish between the philosophical merit of considering x a violation of a person's human rights and the political * Edward Hall

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“…Esa implementación gradual es también esencial en términos de equidad dado el pluralismo existente. Impide que la agenda de los derechos humanos esté dominada solamente por unos países o partes del mundo en función de su perfil histórico, circunstancias y condiciones sociales (Brems, 2009). De otro lado, permite sujetar el orden global a una dinámica inclusiva que es path-dependent en lo que atañe a derechos humanos.…”

Section: I I S U B S I D I a R I E D A D E I N C R E M E N Ta L Iunclassified

“…Ahora bien, este mínimo no se determina en abstracto y, en consecuencia, tendrá cierto grado de movilidad, estará sujeto a una dinámica incremental y sus contornos seguirán dependiendo de un equilibrio entre democracia y derechos (véanse, sobre este punto, Hutchinson, 1999, pp. 642-644;Brems, 2009). También partiré de que la identidad y alcance de cada derecho convencional, mirado desde el plano justificatorio, depende de su fuerza como razón para justificar una limitación jurídica a la autonomía estatal 16 .…”

Section: A R I S a I G L E S I A S V I Lunclassified

Subsidiariedad y tribunales internacionales de derechos humanos: ¿deferencia hacia los estados o división cooperativa del trabajo?

Vila

2017

DERECHO

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Resumen: En este trabajo desarrollo una teoría normativa del principio de subsidiariedad en la adjudicación internacional que pretende ofrecer una respuesta equilibrada a la pregunta de hasta qué punto es legítimo para un órgano como el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos interferir en el criterio estatal cuando valora una denuncia por violación de derechos convencionales. Frente a las demandas de una mayor deferencia hacia los Estados que encontramos tanto en Europa como en Latinoamérica, basadas en una idea estatista de la subsidiariedad, articulo una concepción «cooperativa» de los derechos humanos y del principio de subsidiariedad, uniéndolas a la idea de legitimidad ecológica sugerida por Buchanan. La propuesta que defiendo conduce a una división del trabajo institucional dentro de los sistemas regionales de derechos humanos que aumenta la legitimidad de todas las instituciones involucradas. Al mismo tiempo, desarrollo una forma de implementar esta concepción cooperativa, por una parte, mostrando la importancia de una lógica incremental en la protección efectiva de derechos humanos y, por otra parte, ofreciendo una versión racionalizada de la doctrina del margen de apreciación estatal.Palabras clave: derechos humanos, Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, subsidiariedad, legitimidad ecológica, incrementalismo, doctrina del margen de apreciación Abstract: In this article I develop a normative theory of the subsidiarity principle in international adjudication, which seeks to offer a balanced answer to the question of to what extent is it legitimate for a body such as the European Court of Human Rights to interfere with the national criteria in the face of a complaint on conventional rights violation. In contrast with demands for greater deference to states in both Europe and Latin America, based on a statist idea of subsidiarity, I articulate a «cooperative» understanding of the ideas of human rights and the principle of subsidiarity, linking them to Buchanan's notion of ecological legitimacy. The proposal I defend leads to a division of institutional labor within regional human rights systems that increases the legitimacy of all the institutions involved. At the same time, I devote the last part of the paper to implement such cooperative view, on the one hand, showing the importance of an incremental logic in the effective protection of human rights and, on the other hand, offering a rationalized version of the national margin of appreciation doctrine.

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Human Rights: Minimum and Maximum Perspectives

Cited by 23 publications

References 0 publications

European Consensus between Strategy and Principle

European Consensus between Strategy and Principle

Human Rights, Legitimacy, Political Judgement

Subsidiariedad y tribunales internacionales de derechos humanos: ¿deferencia hacia los estados o división cooperativa del trabajo?

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