Human Rights Conditionality in European Union Trade Negotiations: the Case of the EU–Singapore FTA

McKenzie, Lachlan; Meissner, Katharina L.

doi:10.1111/jcms.12522

Cited by 40 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…Two examples are the EU's trade agreements with Singapore and Vietnam. In the first case, conditionality in the agreement was accompanied by a side letter recognizing Singapore's human rights practices (McKenzie and Meissner 2017). In the latter case, the concluded agreement does not explicitly set out the suspension of trade in case of breaching human rights (Hoang and Sicurelli 2017: 11) which also undermines the conditionality clause's legal liability.…”

Section: Human Rights Conditionality In Eu Trade Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The paradox of human rights conditionality in EU trade policy: when strategic interests drive policy outcomes

Meissner

McKenzie

2018

Journal of European Public Policy

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Increasingly, trade agendas are expanding to include non-commercial objectives such as the promotion of fundamental political and human rights. Although the European Parliament (EP) positions itself as an advocate of such objectives in the conclusion of European Union (EU) trade agreements, it rarely insists on them in negotiations. Yet, in the negotiations with Canada, the EP successfully took a tough stance on a human rights conditionality clause. Why did the EP invest political resources in insisting on conditionality in the agreement with Canadaa country which is among the top five regarding fundamental rights? We argue that, due to limited organizational capacity, composite actors, such as the EP, have to select 'strategic issues' among political events that make them appear as unique supporters of public interest. In this context, composite actors factor in saliency in their utility calculation of investing political resources in a policy issue.

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Section: Human Rights Conditionality In Eu Trade Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The paradox of human rights conditionality in EU trade policy: when strategic interests drive policy outcomes

Meissner

McKenzie

2018

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…However, in some instances where the trade partner expresses a lack of resonance with the EU's values, the EU has been willing to curtail its missionary objectives under Article 21 TEU in favour of advancing its commercial interests. 120 The recently concluded EU-Singapore agreement provides a good illustration of how commercial interests may trump social interests in the FTA context.…”

Section: Why Include Human Rights and Social Norms In Ftas?mentioning

confidence: 99%

A critique of the extraterritorial obligations of the EU in relation to human rights clauses and social norms in EU free trade agreements

Gammage¹

2018

Eur. World

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This article examines the nature of the EU’s obligations in relation to human rights and social norms in its free trade agreements (FTAs) with a view to problematising the extent to which such clauses are justiciable and enforceable. While human rights do not fall within the area of exclusive EU competence, it is widely accepted that the EU may be liable for contributing to human rights violations in the context of trade agreements under international law and EU law. Conversely, it will be shown that social norms, including labour standards and principles such as sustainable development and environmental protection, which are increasingly set out in the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters of FTAs, raise more complex questions regarding the territorial reach of EU law. It is submitted that EU FTAs are constructed in such a way as to exclude rights with the effect that the extraterritorial obligations of the EU in relation to human rights clauses and social norms are unlikely to be judicially enforceable in practice. However, in spite of the territorial limitations of EU law in relation to human rights clause and social norms, recent developments in the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) suggest that the EU is nevertheless under an obligation to ensure its trade agreements with developing countries are conducted in a ‘development-friendly’ manner. To conclude, this article advances the argument that the obligation to engage in ‘development-friendly’ trade may serve to extend the territorial reach of EU further, albeit within the confines of trade and cooperation agreements.

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“…However, a pragmatic shift in the future acquiescing to others' preferences is not beyond the realms of possibility. If fact, pragmatism and attempts at adaptation to others have been common in EU trade policy over the last decade (Zimmerman, 2007;García, 2013García, , 2015Mckenzie and Meissner, 2016).…”

Section: Effect On Europe's Market Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

Introduction to the Handbook on the EU and International Trade

Khorana¹,

García²

2018

Handbook on the EU and International Trade

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International trade is, by its very nature, multidisciplinary. Trade exchanges are governed by both private commercial law contracts and public international law and determining what can be traded and how exchanges are to take place. The modern global trading system is underpinned by non-discrimination and governed by a set of global rules that spring from the post-World War II Bretton Woods agreements, in particular the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which, as a centrepiece of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1982), set the Western world, and later the rest of the world, on a path of gradual economic and trade liberalisation. Successive rounds of negotiations for greater trade openness led the way to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, with a robust legal system for the resolution of trade dispute amongst states. With the faltering of the Doha Round and alongside the WTO's legal system, states have embarked on the negotiation of ever more comprehensive 'deep' trade agreements, amongst themselves. These international treaties create further rules (and institutional reforms) and legal systems for the management and governance of trade and investment relations amongst member states. The gains from free trade have been unanimously acclaimed, and even the classical economists argued that open trade based on specialisation would engender greater efficiency and generate trade at lower costs (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1817). The downside of free trade is that whilst it generates gains, it can also lead to losses for certain groups that lose out to international competition. Due to its redistributive effects, which are much more than static trade creation and diversion in economic terms, trade is a highly political matter. Thus, tensions between advocates of trade openness and of protectionism have raged since the Industrial Revolution and continue to the modern times. From a political perspective, supporting the interests of domestic constituents through protectionism makes sense (Milner, 1999). However, international regimes, especially since the 1980s (the WTO, World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes) and transitions to capitalism, have brought forth a higher degree of liberalisation in the global economy, and rapid increases in global trade, until the advent of the 2008 financial crisis. Alongside this, a further 'unbundling' of production processes has taken place (Baldwin, 2013). The advent of 'glocal' production that led to global supply and value chains has resulted in products crossing borders multiple times in the production process, blurring the lines of national boundaries. An example is the production of iPhones that takes place across three continents-phones are designed and research into new product development takes place in the United States (US). Component parts are sourced from the USA, Europe and various Asian states. Assembly of the component parts into phones takes place in China.

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Human Rights Conditionality in European Union Trade Negotiations: the Case of the EU–Singapore FTA

Cited by 40 publications

References 44 publications

The paradox of human rights conditionality in EU trade policy: when strategic interests drive policy outcomes

The paradox of human rights conditionality in EU trade policy: when strategic interests drive policy outcomes

A critique of the extraterritorial obligations of the EU in relation to human rights clauses and social norms in EU free trade agreements

Introduction to the Handbook on the EU and International Trade

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