Human reasoning: Some possible effects of availability

Logical reasoning, world knowledge, and mental imagery: Interconnections in cognitive processes

“…Our assumption that generalized knowledge can influence the reasoning process contrasts with recent proposals by Cox and Griggs (1982) and Pollard (1982) that content effects are only found whenfactual knowledge and episodic memories are available for application to reasoning tasks. These investigators also propose that such available knowledge provides the sole basis for conclusions drawn at the exclusion of logical processes.…”

Perspective effects in nondeontic versions of the Wason selection task

“…It is that perspective effects occur whenever a rule (deontic or not) has a biconditional interpretation, and different perspectives elicit different counterexamples (see Pollard, 1982). The rule "Ifp then q" interpreted as a biconditional has two counterexamples: a "p and not-q" instance and a "not-p and q" instance.…”

Alcoholism and Conditional Reasoning: Difficulties in Specific Mental Domains or in the General Use of Heuristics?

“…There are, for example, approaches such as the one of Griggs (1983) or the one of Pollard (1981Pollard ( , 1982, that point to the fact that some versions are better answered because their contents relate to the subject's previous experiences; the one of Yachanin and Tweney (1982), which states that in the versions with more optimal results there are certain circumstances -in them, generally, the rule is established and one must look for offenders (and not prove if the rule is established or not) and, in many occasions, the subject has to take on the role of an authority that must check if the rule is fulfilled or not -which cannot be appreciated in those that show an inferior performance; the one from the deontic logic (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985, 1989Fodor, 2000), that supports the theory that certain tasks have higher percentages of valid selection because they have rules related to permissions, obligations or prohibitions that make reference to a general domain of deontic reasoning (and not to specific domains); or the one of the mental models theory (JohnsonLaird, 1983(JohnsonLaird, , 2001(JohnsonLaird, , 2006Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1995, 2002JohnsonLaird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992;Johnson-Laird & Hasson, 2003;Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009), which suggests that the content of the propositions have an influence on the possibilities that can be anticipated for them and in their pre-constructed models which, in the selection task, can conduct to certain cards and not others. Of course, it must be acknowledged that the social contracts theory and the hazard management theory can raise arguments against some of those approaches.…”

“…Although some of the heuristics with which it counts can be innate, it seems that most of them come from experience, which means that, when a logical and analytical activity of T2 is repeated a considerable amount of times, it can be automated, it can become a heuristic and be realised in a relatively quick way. If it is considered that Stanovich (2012) seems to place in T1 the cause of the versions of the selection task with rules in terms of social interaction or hazardous situation to be adequately answered by arguing that individuals respond to them according to their heuristics, this is not absolutely incompatible with proposals as those of Griggs (1983), Pollard (1981Pollard ( , 1982, Beller and Spada (2003) or Beller (2010), which refer to the subject's previous experiences.…”