Human Nature and Aristotelian Virtue Ethics

Abstract

<jats:p>Given that it relies on claims about human nature, has Aristotelian virtue ethics (henceforth AVE) been undermined by evolutionary biology? There are at least four objections which are offered in support of the claim that this is so, and I argue that they all fail. The first two (Part 1) maintain that contemporary AVE relies on a concept of human nature which evolutionary biology has undercut and I show this is not so. In Part 2, I try to make it clear that Foot's Aristotelian ethical naturalism, often construed as purporting to provide virtue ethics with a foundation, is not foundationalist and is not attempting to derive ethics from biology. In Part 3, I consider the other two objections. These do not make a misguided assumption about Aristotelian ethical naturalism's foundational aspirations, nor question AVE's use of the concept of human nature, but maintain that some of AVE's empirical assumptions about human nature may well be false, given the facts of our evolution. With respect to these, I argue that, as attempts to undermine AVE specifically, they fail, though they raise significant challenges to our ethical thought quite generally.</jats:p>

Moral affordance, moral expertise, and virtue

“…Becoming a virtuous person depends on the development of practical wisdom (prudence or phronesis). Phronesis is necessary for the correct exercise of any virtue (Hursthouse, 2012). Phronesis informs us of both what we are doing and what we should do (Anscombe, 1957).…”

The Mathematics (and Metaphysics) of Identical Twins

“…Turning now to the second common objection, often it is thought that the theory of evolution might in some way pose problems for the idea of essence. For example, Rosalind Hursthouse (2012, 170) writes, “I accept that, although Aristotle was not the essentialist that Plato was, he certainly did believe some things about species essences which evolutionary biology undercuts.” Quite why she thinks that evolutionary biology undermines Aristotelian essentialism is unclear and she does not expand in great detail. Denis Walsh (2006, 425) also highlights that in modern philosophy of biology, the concept of essence has fallen out of fashion “There is a consensus that essentialism has no part to play in biology.”…”

Media Ethics Theorizing, Reoriented: A Shift in Focus for Individual-Level Analyses

“…Virtue ethics does not assert the nature of virtue with scientistic claims, or that virtue can be discerned from any neutral perspective. Ethical naturalism, Hursthouse (, p. 194) wrote, simply helps us examine “whether my beliefs about which character traits are the virtues can survive my reflective scrutiny and be given some rational justification.” Such a naturalist agenda, she suggested, does not assert a singular—and thus suspicious—notion of the right, but encourages us “to think about what empirical assumptions we make about ourselves as a kind of animal with a contingent nature when we talk about ethics” (Hursthouse, , p. 179).…”

“…Neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics, too often sidelined in the field, provides a promising framework to unify abstract principles with the measurable internalization of moral judgments and manifestation of moral motivation in media work. As philosopher Rosalind Hursthouse (, p. 73) notes, “Built into [virtue ethics] is the claim that part of the virtuous person's practical wisdom is her knowledge, her correct appreciation, of what is truly good, and, indeed, of what is truly pleasant, truly advantageous, truly worthwhile, truly important, truly serious (and, correspondingly, of what is truly bad, unpleasant, or painful, disadvantageous, worthless, unimportant, and trivial).” Advances in moral psychology theories and methods, coupled with significant shifts in media worker autonomy that have been largely brought about by technology‐transformed media industries, require us to respond with more empirical and interpretive media ethics research. These approaches provide a compelling “fit” with virtue ethics, as Haidt et al have noted:

Part of the appeal of virtue theory has always been that it sees morality as embodied in the very structure of the self, not merely as one of the activities of the self… We believe that virtue theories are the most psychologically sound approach to morality.

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