Human Identity and Bioethics

DeGrazia, David

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511614484

Cited by 355 publications

(138 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

116

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…If this theory is correct, then it is false that the author of the advance directive no longer exists. Some (DeGrazia, 2005) have taken this route in an effort to respond to (Identity).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advance directives and knowledge of future selves

Buford

2017

Palgrave Commun

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A number of concerns have been raised with respect to advance directives. Advance directives are intended to allow a person who is currently capable of giving informed consent to determine how they are to be treated at a later time at which they are not competent to give such consent. For example, an advance directive such as a living will might specify that should a patient face severe dementia, certain forms of treatment should not be provided if needed to prolong life. Or an individual might fill out a do-not-resuscitate order asking not to be revived in the event of a heart attack. This article discusses three distinct arguments that have been offered against the legitimacy of some or all advance directives. After laying out each argument, focus is given to a potential response to one of the arguments in particular, an argument labelled the "Ignorance Argument". The argument contends that the potential application of any advance directive is plagued by a host of epistemic issues that are serious enough to hamper the very expression of autonomy advance directives are designed to allow for. A possible response to the argument is developed. The response suggests that the argument may place unduly severe constraints on the type of selfknowledge needed to underwrite the expression of a person's autonomy through the creation of an advance directive. The response identifies some connections between the different arguments. An answer is also given to a recent criticism, offered by Eric Vogelstein (2016), which questions the existence of the type of autonomy needed to underwrite advance directives.

show abstract

“…If this theory is correct, then it is false that the author of the advance directive no longer exists. Some (DeGrazia, 2005) have taken this route in an effort to respond to (Identity).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Advance directives and knowledge of future selves

Buford

2017

Palgrave Commun

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…23 After becoming severely demented by the progression of his Alzheimer's disease, Mr Smart's previously made autonomous decisions will take precedence over his current interests, since he can no longer make autonomous decisions. As David DeGrazia notes, "Since the severely demented individual is presently incapable of autonomy, this reasoning vindicates a strong presumption in favor of honoring advance directives…" (Degrazia, 2005). 24 Of course, Degrazia is reinforcing the original argument made by Ronald Dworkin, which invokes the distinction of critical and experiential interests mentioned earlier (Dworkin, 1993).…”

Section: Transformative Experiencesmentioning

confidence: 96%

The challenge of transformative experiences for advance directives: predicting a future with Alzheimer’s disease

Boerstler

2017

Palgrave Commun

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Some of the experiences that are possible in life are not relatable to others, nor can one learn about them in other ways, at least not in the sense of what it is like to have lived the experience. L.A. Paul calls these kinds of experiences transformative experiences. This article will incorporate Paul's concept into an argument that undermines the moral authority of advance directives in situations where the instructions stated in the directive are in direct conflict with the contemporary interests of a patient who suffers from Alzheimer's disease. Though the conclusion of this paper will be similar to many others in the literature, namely that advance directives should not in all cases be the final authority on how to respect a patient's autonomy, this article will argue for this kind of a thesis in a unique way because it will emphasize the importance of that which no one can know. The argument contends that the lived experience of Alzheimer's disease is a transformative experience, such that one cannot weigh the subjective value of what it is like to be a person with Alzheimer's disease in the relevant way to properly assess the possible future interests and preferences when creating an advance directive. This article is published as part of a collection on selfknowledge in and outside of illness.

show abstract

“…Other authors who take a similar position are Gerald Dworkin [12] and, more recently, [13]. Of central importance to Frankfurt's account of the self is the notion of freedom of will [14][15].…”

Section: Self-control Viewmentioning

confidence: 97%

Psychopharmaceutical Enhancers: Enhancing Identity?

Bolt

Schermer

2009

Neuroethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The use of psychopharmaceuticals to enhance human mental functioning such as cognition and mood has raised a debate on questions regarding identity and authenticity. While some hold that psychopharmaceutical substances can help users to 'become who they really are' and thus strengthen their identity and authenticity, others believe that the substances will lead to inauthenticity, normalization, and socially-enforced adaptation of behaviour and personality. In light of this debate, we studied how persons who actually have experience with the use of psychopharmaceutical medication would view their 'self' or their authentic personal identity in relation to the use of medication. We have interviewed a number of adults diagnosed with ADHD and discussed their experiences with medication use in relation to their conceptions of self and identity. In the first part of this paper we illustrate that the concepts of identity and authenticity play an important and sometimes problematic role in experiences of ADHD adults. This shows that the question about identity and psychopharmacology is not merely an 'academic' issue, but one that influences everyday lives of real people. In order to answer the question whether psychopharmaceuticals threaten personal identity and authenticity, more than empirical research is needed. We also need to analyse the concepts of personal identity, authenticity and self: what do we mean when we are using statements as 'a way of living that is uniquely our own', 'our true self', or 'who we really are'? In the second part of this paper we discuss two important philosophical views on personal identity, authenticity and self: the self-control view as elaborated by Frankfurt, and the self-expression view as proposed by Schechtman. We compare these with the experiences of our respondents to see which view can help us to understand the diverse and often conflicting experiences that people have with medication for ADHD. This will contribute to a better understanding of whether and in which cases personal identity and authenticity are threatened by psychopharmacology.

show abstract

Human Identity and Bioethics

Cited by 355 publications

References 0 publications

Advance directives and knowledge of future selves

Advance directives and knowledge of future selves

The challenge of transformative experiences for advance directives: predicting a future with Alzheimer’s disease

Psychopharmaceutical Enhancers: Enhancing Identity?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About