Human Factors Issues of Accidents at Passively Controlled Rural Level Crossings

Abstract

Collisions between road vehicles and trains at passively controlled level crossings, where no indication is given to drivers of the presence (or absence) of an approaching train, raise important human factors safety concerns. A database search of Canadian level crossing crash data for the 10-year period between 2003 and 2012 and a targeted review of the scientific research literature were conducted to explore the human factors and related risks involved in crashes of this nature. Accidents at passively controlled, rural level crossings where the driver of the road vehicle did not stop constituted 15% of all level crossing crashes. Statistical analysis revealed that this type of accident was most likely to occur in prairie provinces, during daylight hours, and to involve a disproportionate number of heavy vehicles. Nine human factors issues were identified. Four affected driver detection of an approaching train, including sightlines, train conspicuity, unchanging retinal image, and train horn audibility. Five issues related to driver decision making, including looked-but-failed-to-see errors, faulty activation of schema–mental model, distraction, impairment, and information processing. These issues were overlaid across four previously proposed driver approach zones at passive level crossings. Analysis of countermeasures designed for application within the approach zone, which began at the decision sight distance point, revealed several potential countermeasures, including the observation that current minimum sightline guidelines for passive level crossings might not have been adequate to ensure that drivers have sufficient time to assess the threat posed by an approaching train from both directions and to respond appropriately.

Gaze direction and driving behavior of drivers at level crossings

“…This conclusion is in line with the second thesis by Wigglesworth that was mentioned in the introduction of this article. However, a possible alternative explanation that should not be ruled out is that drivers could have committed a kind of looked-but-failed-to-see error (in absence of an immediate threat) as described by Rudin-Brown, French-St. George and Stuart (2014). It is possible that signs that were fixated upon were only processed in a premature sensory stage but did not reach deeper stages of processing like the identification and the retrieval of schemas and scripts connected to it.…”

Is it safe to cross? Identification of trains and their approach speed at level crossings

“…Passive crossings represent 67% of public crossing in operation in Australia (Railway Industry Safety and Standards Board, 2009), 75% in the United States (National Transportation Safety Board., 1998), and 47% in Europe (European Railway Agency, 2012a). Passive crossings are mainly located in rural areas, where train speeds are generally faster (e.g., Laapotti, 2015;Rudin-Brown et al, 2014).…”

Getting the Attention of Drivers Back on Passive Railway Level Crossings: Evaluation of Advanced Flashing Lights

“…Level crossings are therefore governed by a simple rule: the road user must give way to trains. Almost all collisions are the result of the road user failing to obey this rule ( 10 ). At passive crossings, the road user is therefore expected to (i) detect the presence of the crossing, (ii) detect the presence of a train, and (iii) appropriately decide whether it is safe to proceed through the crossing by estimating the train’s speed and arrival time at the crossing.…”

“…Overall, the evidence suggests that of all the driver-related factors, unintentional errors are far more commonplace than deliberate violations ( 11 –14 ). The main factors leading to such errors are: insufficient sighting distances, or limited conspicuity of the warning signs and/or approaching train; drivers’ lack of awareness of the required response to passive crossing warning signs; drivers’ inability to correctly assess if sufficient time is available to safely complete the crossing ( 15 ), particularly on account of poor ability to estimate the speed of trains as they approach ( 16 ); inattention as a result of complacency caused by low expectations of encountering a train ( 17 ), or distraction ( 18 ); and the so-called “looked-but-failed-to-see” error ( 10 ), in which drivers fail to identify hazards despite looking at the hazard’s source, largely resulting from limitations in human information processing.…”