Human Emotions

Izard, Carroll E.

doi:10.1007/978-1-4899-2209-0

Cited by 3,373 publications

(2,724 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

2,487

Contrasting

Unclassified

168

Order By: Relevance

“…The emotion of disgust was chosen because this was thought to underlie the effects previously observed in the explicit familiarity task (Stone & Valentine, 2004, in press-b) and the attention orientation task (Stone & Valentine, in press-a). The emotion of disgust serves to protect against physical or psychological contamination and motivates avoidance of the object of disgust (e.g., Charash & McKay, 2002;Druschel & Sherman, 1999;Izard, 1977;Levenson, 1994;Nabi, 2002;Newhagen, 1998;Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1999).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Psychological contamination could occur because of association with an unpleasant individual, and disgust has been specifically related to the avoidance of ideas or persons regarded as morally corrupt (Izard, 1977;Nabi, 2002;Rozin et al, 1999). Thus, disgust was thought to underlie the below chance accuracy of explicit familiarity responses to the faces of famous persons evaluated as evil, and the orientation of attention away from these faces.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Strength of visual percept generated by famous faces perceived without awareness: Effects of affective valence, response latency, and visual field

Stone

Valentine

2005

Consciousness and Cognition

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strength of visual percept generated by famous faces perceived without awareness: Effects of affective valence, response latency, and visual field

Stone

Valentine

2005

Consciousness and Cognition

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…However, it is worth noting that studies of NA and health typically do not control for PA, leaving the interpretation of that literature in regard to valence ambiguous. Although there is much debate regarding the structure of affect (Ekman, 1992;Izard, 1977;Larsen & Diener, 1992;Russell, 1980;Tomkins, 1963;Watson & Tellegen, 1985), when not conceptualized as basic, separate emotions, it has frequently been conceptualized according to a circumplex structure. In this model, affect exists on two dimensions: one describing positive versus negative valence (e.g., happy vs. sad), and one delineating activation levels (e.g., aroused vs. unaroused) (Russell, 1980).…”

Section: Pamentioning

confidence: 99%

Does positive affect influence health?

Pressman

Cohen

2005

Psychological Bulletin

1,704

1,566

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This review highlights consistent patterns in the literature associating positive affect (PA) and physical health. However, it also raises serious conceptual and methodological reservations. Evidence suggests an association of trait PA and lower morbidity and of state and trait PA and decreased symptoms and pain. Trait PA is also associated with increased longevity among older community-dwelling individuals. The literature on PA and surviving serious illness is inconsistent. Experimentally inducing intense bouts of activated state PA triggers short-term rises in physiological arousal and associated (potentially harmful) effects on immune, cardiovascular, and pulmonary function. However, arousing effects of state PA are not generally found in naturalistic ambulatory studies in which bouts of PA are typically less intense and often associated with health protective responses. A theoretical framework to guide further study is proposed.Keywords: positive affect, mortality, morbidity, health, emotions A cheerful heart is good medicine.-Proverbs 17:22Self-help books, popular magazines, and Sunday newspaper supplements have suggested for years that positive affect (PA) can improve people's health. However, this hypothesis has been relatively ignored in research on psychological predictors of health. For example, a search of PsycINFO revealed that there are over 20 times more studies on depression and health than there are on happiness and health. Although the recent interest in "positive psychology" has focused attention on the potential benefits of positive feelings (e.g., Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), there has been little critical discussion of the evidence linking PA to physical health. In this article, we review the literature examining the association between measures of PA and markers of physical health status, examine the conceptual and methodological weaknesses in the existing literature, and discuss how PA could get "under the skin" to influence health. PAWe define PA as the feelings that reflect a level of pleasurable engagement with the environment (Clark, Watson, & Leeka, 1989) such as happiness, joy, excitement, enthusiasm, and contentment. These can be brief, longer lasting, or more stable traitlike feelings. Although some use the terms affect, mood, and emotion to distinguish duration, these uses are not applied consistently in the literature, and thus we use these terms interchangeably. We, however, distinguish between studies using measures that assess more stable disposition-like PA, which we refer to as trait PA, and those measuring or manipulating relatively short-term bouts of positive emotions, which we refer to as state PA.To date, reviews examining associations between positive psychological constructs and health outcomes have been broad in scope, including traits such as self-esteem, extraversion, purpose, mastery, and optimism along with PA (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005;Ryff, 2003;Salovey, Rothman, Detweiler, & Steward, 2000;Zautra, 2003). Hence, it has been difficult to separate t...

show abstract

“…Though surprise clearly involves an emotional reaction (often accompanied by a startle response), it also seems to serve a strategic, cognitive goal, as it directs attention to explain why the surprising event occurred and to learn for the future (e.g., Macedo, 2010;Maguire, Maguire & Keane, 2011;Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). Originally conceived of as a "basic emotion" (e.g., Darwin, 1872;Ekman & Friesen, 1971;Izard, 1977;Plutchik, 1991;Tomkins, 1962), more recently surprise has been re-appraised as a cognitive state because, unlike most emotions, it can be either positively or negatively valenced (Ortony & Turner, 1990; see also Kahneman & Miller, 1986;Maguire et al, 2011). Indeed, nowadays, cognitive aspects of surprise are routinely mentioned in the affective literature; for instance, Wilson and Gilbert (2008) explicitly discuss explanatory aspects of surprise in affective adaptation.…”

Section: A Cognitive Emotion: Theoretical Perspectives On Surprisementioning

confidence: 99%

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Foster

Keane

2015

Cognitive Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The UCD community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters! (@ucd_oa) Some rights reserved. For more information, please see the item record link above. TitleWhy some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty Publisher's statement This is the author's version of a work that was accepted for publication in Cognitive Psychology. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in Cognitive Psychology (VOL 81, ISSUE 2015, (2015 Early theories of surprise, including Darwin's, argued that it was predominantly a basic emotion. Recently, theories have taken a more cognitive view of surprise, casting it as a process of "making sense of surprising events". The current paper advances the view that the essence of this sense-making process is explanation; specifically, that people's perception of surprise is a metacognitive estimate of the cognitive work involved in explaining an abnormal event. So, some surprises are more surprising because they are harder toexplain. This proposal is tested in eight experiments that explore how (i) the contents of memory can influence surprise, (ii) different classes of scenarios can retrieve more/less relevant knowledge from memory to explain surprising outcomes, (iii) how partial explanations constrain the explanation process reducing surprise, (iv) how, overall, any factor that acts to increase the cognitive work in explaining a surprising event, results in higher levels of surprise (e.g., task demands to find several rather than just one explanation). Across the present studies, using a many different materials, paradigms and measures, it is consistently and repeatedly found that the difficulty of explaining a surprising outcome is the best predictor for people's perceptions of the surprisingness of events. Alternative accounts of these results are considered, as are future directions for this research.

show abstract

Human Emotions

Cited by 3,373 publications

References 0 publications

Strength of visual percept generated by famous faces perceived without awareness: Effects of affective valence, response latency, and visual field

Strength of visual percept generated by famous faces perceived without awareness: Effects of affective valence, response latency, and visual field

Does positive affect influence health?

Why some surprises are more surprising than others: Surprise as a metacognitive sense of explanatory difficulty

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About