Human Dignity, Capital Punishment, and an African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights

Abstract

In this article I spell out a conception of dignity grounded in African moral thinking that provides a plausible philosophical foundation for human rights, focusing on the particular human right not to be executed by the state. I first demonstrate that the South African Constitutional Court's sub-Saharan explanations of why the death penalty is degrading all counterintuitively entail that using deadly force against aggressors is degrading as well. Then, I draw on one major strand of Afro-communitarian thought to develop a novel conception of dignity as the view that what is special and inviolable about human nature is our capacity for harmonious relationships. I argue that a principle of respect for the dignity of such a capacity entails that the death penalty is an indignity but that deadly force in self-or other-defense need not be, and I contend that this Africaninspired principle promises to do no worse than the more Western, Kantian principle of respect for autonomy at accounting for a broad range of human rights.

African Conceptions of Human Dignity: Vitality and Community as the Ground of Human Rights

“…One clue going in that this theory is inadequate to account for the full range of human rights is the narrowness of the topics that its African friends (and their Western, Christian cousins) are most known for addressing. They characteristically espouse views on 9 I first articulates this conception of dignity in detail and applied it to moral debate about the death penalty in Metz (2010) the morality of abortion, cloning, euthanasia, assisted suicide, drugs/alcohol, poverty and the death penalty. These are mainly 'life and death' matters, for which one would naturally expect a vitality theory to have some clear implications.…”

Personhood and Rights in an African Tradition

“…4 These are three distinct notions of personhood that I find in Menkiti's article on personhood, but Menkiti is ultimately after a certain notion of personhood. I here submit that Menkiti is ultimately after the agent-centred notion of personhood, and there is convergence in the literature to support this view (Wiredu 1992Dzobo 1992;Gyekye 1997;Ikuenobe 2006;Metz 2007Metz , 2010Behrens 2013;Molefe 2016).…”

“…Metz is more explicit in this regard. He informs us that to ' … achieve the state of being a (person) is entirely constituted by relating to others in a certain manner' (Metz 2010, 84 author's emphasis). He further notes that personhood can only be achieved by 'relating positively' with others (84).…”

Just the beginning for ubuntu: reply to Matolino and Kwindingwi

“…I take their piece to be directed at me (among others) because they criticise the view that ubuntu is sensibly viewed as an 'ethical theory' (Matolino and Kwindingwi 2013: p. 203), and because I believe that I am the one most widely known for interpreting ubuntu in that manner and with that specific phrase (e.g. Metz 2007Metz , 2009aMetz , 2009bMetz , 2010aMetz , 2011Metz , 2012Metz , 2013. In any event, I have spent a large chunk of my research time over the last seven years thinking, writing and supervising postgraduate research about ubuntu, and so have a keen interest in obtaining clarity about why those activities have been worth undertaking and continue to merit pursuit.…”