Human Dignity and the Adjudication of Environmental Rights

Townsend, Dina L.

doi:10.4337/9781789905946

Cited by 3 publications

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“…4. See our Townsend and Townsend (2020) for an exploration of the treatment of Indigenous speech through the lens of feminist speech act theory, rather than epistemic injustice. We see these as complementary, rather than competing analyses, See footnote 12.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, it seems to us that the sort of silencing involved in radical testimonial injustice may be viewed as a species of the illocutionary silencing discussed by Hornsby and Langton, since the failure of a piece of testimony to register with the hearer's 'testimonial sensibilities' can be seen as a failure of uptake or 'reciprocity'. See Townsend and Townsend (2020) for discussion of the Sarayaku case within the Hornsby-Langton framework. 13.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic Injustice and Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System

Townsend

2020

Social Epistemology

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In this paper we examine the epistemic treatment of Indigenous peoples by the Inter-American Court and Commission on Human Rights, two institutions that have sought to affirm the rights of Indigenous peoples in the wake of colonialism and industrial encroachment onto Indigenous land. The Court and Commission have sought to do this in two ways. First, they have insisted on a right to consultation, according to which any Indigenous peoples who would be affected by industrial activity must be given a say in the decision-making process. Second, they have given an expansive interpretation of the right to property in order to encompass Indigenous relations to land. We argue that although the right to consultation and the expanded right to property have led to a number of landmark legal victories for Indigenous peoples, they nonetheless have an epistemic dark side in that they foster forms of epistemic injustice. What happens in the course of consultation often involves a kind of epistemic objectification of Indigenous testimony that amounts to radical testimonial injustice. And the requirement that Indigenous peoples frame their relation to land in the language of 'property' stifles their ability to articulate that relation, thus amounting to a hermeneutical injustice.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%