Human Brain Organoids and Consciousness

Abstract

This article proposes a methodological schema for engaging in a productive discussion of ethical issues regarding human brain organoids (HBOs), which are three-dimensional cortical neural tissues created using human pluripotent stem cells. Although moral consideration of HBOs significantly involves the possibility that they have consciousness, there is no widely accepted procedure to determine whether HBOs are conscious. Given that this is the case, it has been argued that we should adopt a precautionary principle about consciousness according to which, if we are not certain whether HBOs have consciousness—and where treating HBOs as not having consciousness may cause harm to them—we should proceed as if they do have consciousness. This article emphasizes a methodological advantage of adopting the precautionary principle: it enables us to sidestep the question of whether HBOs have consciousness (the whether-question) and, instead, directly address the question of what kinds of conscious experiences HBOs can have (the what-kind-question), where the what-kind-question is more tractable than the whether-question. By addressing the what-kind-question (and, in particular, the question of what kinds of valenced experiences HBOs can have), we will be able to examine how much moral consideration HBOs deserve. With this in mind, this article confronts the what-kind-question with the assistance of experimental studies of consciousness and suggests an ethical framework which supports restricting the creation and use of HBOs in bioscience.

Human cerebral organoids: the ethical stance of scientists

“…Koplin and Savulescu [ 12 ] proposed a layering of the moral status of HCOs and their corresponding protection in research, depending on their development of consciousness and higher cognitive capacities. It should be noted, however, that while different scholars (e.g., [ 1 , 16 ]) argue that in cases of uncertainty it is better to err “on the side of generosity and treat them as if they have at least partial moral status” [ 12 ], our participants seem to lean on the other side, preferring to be sure of consciousness arising in HCOs before committing to any consideration on their alleged moral status.…”

“…Several scholars have begun to consider the implications of the potential emergence of sentience (the basic ability to feel pain and pleasure) or even consciousness (more complex subjective phenomenal experiences) in HCOs [ 5 , 12 , 14 , 15 , 19 ]. Given the difficulty of detecting the presence of consciousness in HCOs, the precautionary principle—treating as conscious any cerebral organoids that have the minimal structures deemed necessary for the emergence of consciousness in humans—has recently been proposed as the default ethical position [ 1 , 16 ]. Based on the potential presence of consciousness, consideration has then been given to whether and what moral status should be granted to HCOs.…”

Advancing preclinical models of psychiatric disorders with human brain organoid cultures

“…The ethics landscape of human organoid research is an emerging topic beyond the scope of the present article, and while several viewpoints have been published in recent years, there exists no consensus framework on best practices or broadly adopted research restrictions [4][5][6][7][8][9]. A recent "decision-tree" has been proposed as a roadmap for researchers working with complex human brain organoids that may reach some level of consciousness [10].…”

Human Brain Organoids in Migraine Research: Pathogenesis and Drug Development

“…Neuroethics [ 134 ] cannot be separated from the neuroscience of human brain organoids. Research with ex vivo brain tissue and brain organoids raises several neuroethical questions and concerns, for example, morality and the potential for consciousness [ 135 , 136 , 137 ]. For instance, the transplantation of organoids in rodent brains has raised some concerns as to how a juncture would be treated as a human–rodent mixture, legally and ethically [ 137 , 138 ].…”